These are eminently measurable factors that the United States can influence quite directly. This implies that, if the deployment of U. Free-riding might therefore be more prevalent in its non-material version. In our empirical analysis, which covers the period —, we rely on global survey data that draw on the responses of over , people in about countries.
Even when we control for a number of other relevant factors that can impact willingness to fight, U. The forward-deployment of U. The results also indicate the existence of a tripwire- or free-riding threshold. A few hundred troops, however, may well be enough. These numbers approximate the size of a battalion — that is to say, an independently-functioning military unit.
But a battalion-sized U. The empirical evidence of non-material free-riding means that President Trump and the many who share his opinion is not necessarily in the wrong when he claims that allies free-ride. However, it is also true that U. They are, in fact, key ingredients of a long-standing grand strategy that stresses the centrality of a global presence; vital U. Both the United States and its allies gain much and lose a bit from such relationships.
For that reason alone, we can surely expect that the debates and bargaining about defense burdens and free-riding will continue for a long time. Ironically, these shortcomings were also found in abundance in the U. At heart lies an understanding of war replete with theoretical barriers and unfounded presumptions, constituting an up-stream source of analytical friction with real implications for how strategy is conceived and implemented.
The foundational premise of our study of war should emphasize its political nature: Strikingly, a similarly supporting rather than supported function of military force is found in the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine. Though the Gerasimov Doctrine is neither doctrine nor the intellectual creation only of General Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, the former Russian chief of general staff, it does provide the main coherent theorization of the shadowy, gradualist approach used by Putin in the Near Abroad—in Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, and elsewhere.
Such a framework can be constructed by interrogating the irregular conflicts of the past to derive a guide, or blueprint, for analysis and action. The approach presented here offers an intellectual blueprint for the necessary type of analysis. Rather than front-load the analytical process with answers, it begins with five questions. These questions, if used for careful interrogation of threat strategy, correct many of the cognitive shortcomings of present-day analysis and policy.
Rather than detach military and security affairs from their political purpose, they force close consideration of their intimate relation. Rather than bifurcate artificially state and non-state uses of force, they anticipate a blending of styles and of modes of violence to achieve a political effect.
Rather than let the use of violence, or of terrorism, eclipse the broader strategy at play, they compel a comprehensive analysis of wide-ranging lines of effort and their interaction. It is through careful engagement with these questions, and the construction of an effective counter-strategy, that we do better in the challenge at hand. The approach serves to map both irregular strategy and operational art, whether violent or non-violent, by either state or non-state actors. In effect, the manner of analyzing violence presented in this article opens a door to sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of contention across the standard spectrums and dichotomies.
By so doing, it also guides the construction of an effective response to the ambiguous threats of the 21st century. It is available here. Over the past five years, Contemporary Security Policy has published various articles that address questions of power, rules as well as their interaction. These articles are made freely available until the end of April.
In her award-winning article, Trine Flockhart argues that power and rules vary across the different orders in the world. We can no longer speak of one set of powers or rules, but there are indeed multiple constellations of powers and rules. A critical theme over the last two decades has also been the inability of international great powers to take on local powers and set the rule. The power of rules and the rule of power are also themes relevant in new arenas of contestation. Cyber has also become a critical topic for CSP over the last five years.
Ilai Saltzman analyses cyber posturing and the offense-defense balance, while Krzysztof Feliks Sliwinski discusses the difficulty of the EU to become an actor in the field of cyber. Finally, where there are emerging powers, there are old powers. While other journals and magazines have paid considerable attention to the United States-China rivalry, authors in CSP have also considered the role of the Old Continent.
Jolyon Howorth provides a sober overview of EU strategic thinking on the emerging powers. These nine articles provide a glimpse of the scholarship that CSP publishes on powers and rules.
CSP therefore welcomes future submissions on this theme. There appears to be agreement at the international level that those who employ chemical weapons should be punished. But in the Syrian case it has been clear that this does not equate to a guarantee of swift prosecution. The chemical weapon norm has been repeatedly violated by parties in the Syrian civil war. The gross violation of such an internationally-sacrosanct norm would appear to provide clear impetus for collective action; including criminal justice.
After all, chemical weapon issues have received heightened attention as compared to other war-crimes. Chemical weapon atrocities are also subject to a comparatively well-developed set of international instruments. Yet, the diplomatic discourse on this matter has been particularistic and impotent. This leaves us currently, in a situation which borders on farce: Yet collective action between all major powers against impunity, even on this narrow issue, seems a bridge too far. It is clear, that the apparent deadlock on the issue of chemical weapon justice, centres at one level on a situation in which veto powers in the UN Security Council have committed to differing accounts of who is behind chemical weapon use in Syria.
It is also clear that selective outrage has been the norm, in the context of a broader bloody and vicious civil war. Analysis needs to go beyond narrowly construed strategic conceptions of the drivers of public diplomacy. This is in the sense that justice has informed decision making in both national and international forums. In laying out our argument, we point to areas of agreement, disagreement as well as practical initiatives particularly in areas such as war-crime documentation, multilateral attribution processes and prosecution. Our study is presented as a historical case-study as part of an attempt to point to key contingencies, moments, path-dependencies and re-current patterns of behaviour.
However, justice initiatives are tightly intertwined with other drives and interests of states. This has contributed to a situation in which where has been a partial stalling of the justice agenda in relation to chemical weapons. Our findings helps contextualise events in Spring , which led to U. They help us understand the structures of the disagreements within the UNSC and OPCW in particular, which have served to motivate, but also curtail initiatives to ensure accountability for those who employ chemical weapons.
Mattia Cacciatori is a lecturer in conflict and security at the University of Bath. How robust is the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has recently come under severe attack? They argue that debate over international norms does not necessarily result in erosion, but may also strengthen international norms.
Yet, the five official nuclear weapon states and their allies strongly oppose a nuclear ban. The NPT is, after all, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. With near universal membership, the NPT can be considered a success of global security governance. However, like all systems of norms, the regime has not been free from contestation; challenges to its normative structure have been a common feature. Yet, so far it has proven robust. Why this relative stability, and what about the future?
Multilateral treaty regimes like the NPT present complex compromises among actors with multiple interests and worldviews. Therefore, the regimes incorporate structural fault lines deriving from the main differences of interests and ideas manifest already during the negotiations. These fault lines spark continued processes of contestation which keep normative dynamics within the regime alive. Such disputes about normative meaning are the engine driving norm dynamics.
They are instantiated by actors committed to preserve the status quo, to reform, or to revolutionize the regime. Whether contestation leads to normative progress, or blockage or even decay ultimately depends on three factors: Many disputes within the NPT relate to its inherent inequality: These differences create opposite perspectives on the NPT, the way it operates, and how to improve its functioning.
From these perspectives, different ways to understand the regime norms, their relative weight and their interrelations result, all structured by conflicting justice claims. NWS justify their privileged status by their responsibilities for world order as permanent members of the UN Security Council: In addition, developing countries claim preferred access to civilian nuclear energy as compensation for the past wrongs of colonial exploitation: If accompanied by a spirit of understanding and compromise, positive norm dynamics emerge.
But when norm contestation engenders an antagonistic feedback cycle that drives parties further apart, the regime community is shattered; blatant non-compliance might then meet insufficient response, parties turn to unilateralism and seek progress outside the procedures of the NPT. This may lead to norm erosion or even regime collapse.
Such processes might arise when deeply emotionalized justice claims guide either side and make compromising difficult. The origins of the Humanitarian Initiative and the failure of the RevCon on the Middle East suggest that this is most likely when parties get frustrated by a series of broken promises: When such antagonistic contestation coalitions face each other over time, preventing all adaptation of the norm system to changing circumstances, the regime will look increasingly ineffective.
Members may lose interest in membership. Their activities enhance the chances for consensus-building considerably. Eventually, the NPT inequality problem can only be solved through a credible disarmament process, reciprocated by improved nonproliferation measures. Without satisfactory offers of civilian assistance and cooperation to the Global South by the North, regime efficiency will remain limited. The prospect of win-win results mitigates regime inequality and induces cooperation. What does that tell us for the future of the NPT given the newly established nuclear ban treaty?
For one, the ban treaty should not be regarded as competing with but rather as complementary to the NPT. Sure, a stronger wording would have been desirable. Yet, the humanitarian initiative is a direct result of ongoing contestation processes within the NPT, which resulted in frustration and anger of many NNWS with the slow pace of disarmament within the NPT. By moving the issue beyond the NPT, the protagonists of the humanitarian initiative and the promoters of the ban treaty took a last resort, regained recognition for their demands and exerted considerable normative pressure on the NWS and their allies.
Furthermore, many ban advocates have been actors with a long-standing commitment for the NPT. That they went beyond the NPT does not mean they want to destroy it. It could rather be assumed that they keep their long-standing commitment for the NPT. President in January , many observers feared that he would abandon U. Foreign policy experts might be forgiven for thinking that Trump plays fast and loose with the so-called alliance dilemma. This alliance dilemma arises when a defender calibrates its security commitments to its ally.
If the ally is confident that the defender will rescue it, then that ally might take undesirable risks. The defender thus worries of entrapment—that is, of being dragged into unwanted wars. However, if that ally doubts that it can truly rely on its defender in a future crisis, then it fears abandonment. Whereas Trump generated abandonment fears as presidential candidate, his actions as president might be seen as being blind to entrapment risks.
Are they really so blind, though? Moreover, scholars often have overlooked how an underlying conflict makes both alliance formation and war more likely, making it empirically difficult to tease out an underlying entrapment risk from confounding factors. Leaders might even discount entrapment risks in pursuing their international strategies. Four factors allegedly drive entrapment risks. If attack is easy and at least three great powers exist, then entrapment is likely because the defender will see the ally as necessary for maintaining a favorable balance of power.
The third factor is reputation. An ally might believe that it will receive the support of a defender eager to preserve its commitments just for the sake of appearing reliable. The final factor is transnational ideological. In the case of NATO, the alliance evolved from securing members against the Soviet threat to defending liberal democratic values. Accordingly, states that appeal to those values can maximize their likelihood in gaining support from that alliance, especially if they can also leverage elite networks.
On a few occasions, Arab armies have fought each other. However, the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait was the first time in modern history that one Arab country had completely absorbed another one. In response, traditional adversaries were persuaded to put their differences aside, at least temporarily, to face the Iraqi aggression. Furthermore, instead of supporting the opposing sides in the conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union worked together to end the crisis. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent war were not related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Tel Aviv had played no role in precipitating those events.
Nevertheless, Israel found itself involved in the war in at least three ways. First, Saddam Hussein sought to link his occupation of Kuwait to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Second, in an attempt to get Israel involved in the fighting and break the international coalition, Iraq launched missile attacks on targets inside Israel. Third, the war changed the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and provided new incentives to pursue a comprehensive peace. Baghdad, he argued, would agree to review the Kuwaiti question if Israel declared itself ready to abandon the territories it had occupied in Israel naturally would refuse.
This attempt to link the Gulf crisis to the Arab-Israeli conflict did not work and, indeed, turned out to be another major strategic miscalculation. During the Gulf War, 39 Iraqi Scud missiles armed with conventional warheads were launched against Israel. These were the first strikes of consequence at Israeli targets since the war.
Without their political backing, the war against Iraq would stop and attention would shift to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel, however, was determined not to be used as a tool to break the coalition.
Israel will not be the first nation to intro duce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The Trump administration may not want war with Russia, but it nevertheless believes that peace is best achieved through strength. Potter and Harlan W. Their confidence made Georgian leaders more aggressive towards Russia than what was rationally justifiable, thereby creating the danger for that local conflict to spiral out of control. These two possibilities failed to materialize. Russell received his doctorate in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, previously served as a political-military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and was an adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University. The foundational premise of our study of war should emphasize its political nature:
Traditionally, Israeli deterrence was designed to compel neighboring Arab states to refrain from attacking its territory with large conventional forces. These Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel have had significant military and strategic ramifications. First, the attacks demonstrated that hostile states that do not share borders with Israel still can inflict harm on the Jewish state.
These missiles, potentially coupled with chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities, have substantially altered the security environment in the whole Middle East. Second, despite these attacks, it is important to point out that Saddam Hussein refrained from using chemical warheads, which he had used in the war against Iran Finally, the war provided significant momentum for a comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
The main reason behind this momentum was American determination to reassure the Arab partners in the anti-Iraq coalition that the United States had formulated a plan for peace. Several months after the end of hostilities, Washington succeeded in convening an international conference in Madrid to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The major regional and international powers were represented, and several joint committees were created to address various aspects of the conflict e.
This opportunity, like many others, how ever, was missed. First, the Arab world was severely divided and polarized by the war. But a few Arab states such as Jordan and Yemen supported Iraq. The Israeli elections resulted in an improvement of U. In short, despite a little tension between the Bush administration and the Likud-led Israeli government, the war confirmed American strategic and security commitments to Israel. The outcome of the Madrid conference was slow and modest progress toward a comprehensive peace. The breakthrough came a few months later when the Palestinians and Israelis directly negotiated and signed the Oslo agreement.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the experience of the Gulf War and its aftermath. As a result, the likelihood of a war between Israel and its Arab neighbors was substantially reduced. Second, for Israel, the Gulf War was an almost unqualified blessing. This conclusion applies also to the next round of fighting in the Persian Gulf, the war in Iraq. In March of that year, the United States led an international coalition that toppled Saddam Hussein and later arrested him. This is the first time in modern history that the leader of a major Arab state had been overthrown by a foreign power.
Israel did not play any role in the war and, unlike during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not launch missile attacks on Israeli targets. First, Saddam Hussein adopted a militant stand toward Israel, opposed the peace process and supported Palestinian suicide attacks. His removal from power is seen as a positive development in Tel Aviv. However, the uncertainty regarding the future of post-Saddam Iraq suggests that caution should be applied. In the near future, any government in Baghdad is likely to be preoccupied with rebuilding the country; establishing relations with the Jewish state is not likely to be at the top of the agenda.
In short, a post-Saddam Iraq may not remain an enemy of Israel, but it also is not likely to become a friend. Saudi leaders proposed peace plans under which Riyadh would normalize relations with Tel Aviv, albeit under certain conditions. Saddam Hussein was one of a few Arab leaders who showed no sign of recognizing Israel or accepting a peaceful solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict. His departure from the scene is likely to enhance the chances for peaceful negotiations.
Indeed, one month after the toppling of the Hussein regime, the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia initiated a new peace plan, the Roadmap, to end the conflict. Fourth, the ability of the Arab states to form an eastern front Iraq, Syria and Jordan as well as the Palestinians against Israel has considerably diminished.
This front has always been considered by the Israeli strategic planners as more dangerous than the northern and southern fronts because it is closer to the center the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa triangle. In actual ity, Israel was not attacked, either because Iraq did not have the capability or because it had no intention of doing so. One of the most important strategic developments in the Israeli nuclear posture is its acquisition of a sea-based nuclear capability. The roots of this strategic development lie in the Iran-Iraq War.
During this conflict, both Tehran and Baghdad, as well as other Arab countries, acquired and enhanced their missile capabilities. Accordingly, Israeli strategists and top military leaders have considered adding a number of Dolphin-class submarines to their naval arsenal.
Decisions to buy them, however, were deferred due to operational and financial considerations.
In the mids, Israel ordered three specially designed submarines from Germany; they were delivered in and They are believed to have a range of several hundred miles and can remain at sea for up to a month. It was reported that Israel carried out tests of these missile systems in the Indian Ocean in May Unlike the other nuclear powers, Israel has maintained a certain level of ambiguity regarding its nuclear status.
Israeli officials have never confirmed or denied having nuclear weapons. The suspicion and fog surrounding this question nuclear weapons are constructive, because they strengthen our deterrent. Thus, when asked about the precise state of their nuclear-weapons capacity, Israeli officials have always repeated what former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said in the mids: Israel will not be the first nation to intro duce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.
One of the few public statements was made by David Ben-Gurion in December , when he informed the Knesset that the nuclear reactor in Dimona was designed for research and peaceful purposes. He was lured out of hiding in London by a female Israeli secret agent who persuaded him that she wanted to meet him in Rome. Once there, he was drugged by other Israeli agents and brought home. Later that year, Vanunu was jailed for 18 years following a trial for treason that was held in secret.
He spent most of his sentence in solitary confinement. Upon his release in , several restrictions were imposed on his travel and contact with foreigners. Most Israelis consider this policy of nuclear opacity as a great strategic success. By not admitting to having nuclear weapons, Israel has avoided being in violation of the global nonproliferation regime. At the same time, Israel was able to keep its enemies guessing about its military capabilities, denying them an incentive to pursue a nuclear option.
Meanwhile, by not denying it had a nuclear-weapons capability, Tel Aviv has been able to deter its enemies from posing an existential threat. This argument has two bases: Israel is not only the only nuclear power in the Middle East; it also has one of the most advanced ballistic-missile programs in the region. Since the state was created in the late s, Israel has invested substantial resources in research, development, testing and deployment of a variety of missile systems.
As in building nuclear capability, Israel initially needed foreign assistance and later developed its own infrastructure and indigenous capability. Since the mids, the United States has openly supplied Lance missiles and missile-production technology to Israel. The missile was reported to fly kilometers miles carrying a payload big enough for a nuclear warhead. It is important to point out that the development and deployment of Israeli missiles is part of the broad and intense arms race in the Middle East. Iran and several Arab states have also acquired shortand medium-range missiles.
In the early decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed greater ability than other countries to operate reconnaissance satellites with different degrees of precision. Given its technological capabilities, Israel has been able to launch its own satellite, Ofeq, since This development means that Israel has become the only state in the Middle East and one of only a handful of countries in the world with the capability to put objects into orbit.
Israel has invested substantial human and financial resources in the space industry since the early s. Israel Space Agency was created in A major goal has been to acquire an independent orbital capability e. These were research satellites. An attempt to launch Ofeq-4 failed in , but Ofeq-5 was successfully launched in Again, in , the defense establishment failed to launch Ofeq In response, the United States and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint development of the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile ATBM system in The Patriot missile defense batteries, built by the United States as an anti-aircraft system and modified to guard against incoming missiles, had only a partial success against the Iraqi Scud missiles in the Gulf War.
This failure to intercept all Scud missiles has further underlined the need for a more accurate missile-defense system and gave a momentum to the American-Israeli cooperation to build Arrow. Arrow is one of the most advanced missile-defense systems in the world. It is a two-stage, solid-fuel missile consisting of high-altitude interceptors able to seek and destroy incoming ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.
A phased-array radar, a fire-control center, and a high-altitude interceptor missile. The system has made significant strides since its first test flight in July It was delivered to the Air Force and declared operational in In closing, three important points need to be highlighted. First, by deploying the Arrow, Israel has become the first and only nation in the world to have a national defense shield.
Accordingly, Arab and some Muslim countries have always accused the United States of adopting a double standard in its nonproliferation policy. A fundamental characteristic of this new policy was the distinction between military applications and civilian uses of nuclear power. Providing nuclear technology to American allies —— under international safeguards —— would enable them to enjoy the benefits of this technology without turning it into weapons.
Thus, Atoms for Peace made it easier to U. Israel was the second nation, after Turkey, to join the program and in signed an agreement with the United States for peaceful nuclear cooperation. After a long delay and strong hesitation, Israel allowed such a visit. This pressure by the Kennedy administration had largely come to a halt when the president was assassinated. Two developments contributed to this outcome.
Israel had already crossed the nuclear threshold, and any attempt to prevent it from acquiring nuclear-weapons capability became counterproductive. In addition, President Johnson was less determined than his predecessor to pressure Israel to open its nuclear installation to inspection and prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Since then, subsequent administrations, regardless of their commitments to nonproliferation, felt there was very little, if anything, they could do. In addition to the fact that most administrations have refrained from exerting pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear-weapons capability, the Congress has rejected taking any measure that would compel the Jewish state to join the international nonproliferation regime. This might have led to a response by the United States and a potential nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers in the Middle East.
These two possibilities failed to materialize. Despite its conventional-weapons, the argument goes, Israel needs a deterrent of last resort to face a potential existential threat. Second, as Shai Feldman argues, U. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East has been a major threat to regional peace and global stability for several decades.
Iran and the Arab states have constantly demanded that Israel give up its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT. The Israeli stand on nuclear disarmament has been constant for a long time. Thus, nuclear weapons serve as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. This argument for maintaining nuclear capability is repudiated by some scholars on several grounds. First, some Arabs have been willing to recognize the Jewish state and have negotiated peace agreements with it since the early s, before Israel made the bomb.
In other words, Israeli superiority in conventional weapons, not nuclear capability, has brought Arabs to the negotiating table. The Iran Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the war in Iraq have all contributed to the polarization of Arab policy, the collapse of the eastern front, and the depletion of Arab and Iranian resources. The gap in military capability between Israel and its adversaries has expanded.
As a result, Israel probably has never been more secure from external enemies in its history. Ironically, the argument goes, Israeli nuclear weapons provide incentives to the Arabs and Iranians to acquire a nuclear capability or at least chemical and biological weapons. Les Deux Bombes Paris: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, , p. Many reports suggested that these weapons grade materials had ended up in Israel. However, no conclusive evidence has been found. Hersh, The Samson Option: