Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policy
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Understanding Putin: The politics of identity and geopolitics in Russian foreign policy discourse
The causal mechanisms that relate nationalism and foreign policy have also been wide ranging: Moreover, the causal relationship between nationalism and foreign policy has also been conceptualized as an interactive one. This eclecticism is noticeable in the study of nationalism and war. The war proneness of nationalism may be a function of the type of nationalist ideology being used.
The nation-state as a product of the ideology of nationalism may be inseparable from war making.
All these elements hostility towards parliament, political parties, elections, capitalists and the bourgeoisie were preserved and developed in the Yugoslav official narrative. Those fears then created aggression, especially among those segments of the ethnic groups which were left outside their new nation-states with the status of a minority: This means that the Yugoslav political system, far from being a one-party system, actually precludes any such system, just as it precludes the multiparty pluralism of bourgeois society. Socialism was by definition a denial of reality. It was not only because of the real political pressure by the Soviet Union especially in moments of crisis, such as in with the invasion of Czechoslovakia or in with the Croatian Spring 34 or because in these years it indeed seemed that liberalism was in worldwide crisis while socialist democracy looked victorious even in West European countries. Although liberal democracy was not entirely new to some of the population, its combination of liberalism with the nation-state was a new one. Instead of democracy as a form of state system, there will be a democracy and freedom of the individual, who is no longer the subject of the state but governs himself and regulates social relationships as the relationships between man and things and not between man and man.
And the international system, ordered upon nationalist principles of self-determination and popular rule, may endogenously produce political violence. More recently, the role of nationalist protests in interstate crisis diplomacy has become more salient, especially in post-Soviet and China studies.
Chapter 11. Communist Yugoslavia and Its “Others”
Are nationalist protests manufactured by the government, or are governments forced to adopt certain foreign policies because of public pressure? The conundrum about nationalism being endogenous or exogenous again rears its head. Nationalism studies is an interdisciplinary field, but within political science interest in nationalism has largely been confined to comparative politics. Over time, the Russians have constructed a certain understanding about the meaning of NATO expansion, which has influenced its response to it.
As time goes by, the construction of the threat of NATO has become stronger, only reinforcing earlier reservations, which strengthens the fear of Western hegemony. The construction of identity is highly politicized; the idea of belonging is perhaps even more powerful than the belonging itself. This paper contends that the West has played a key role in the redefining of Russian exceptionalism. Fears of Western influences contaminating Russian culture or turning its logical regional allies into foes have been fomenting for years.
Russia is at the centre of a civilizational empire, which in part explains its actions in Crimea. Putin considers Crimea an ethnically and culturally Russian region that had been separated from the motherland. This situation needed to be corrected; the ethnic kin needed to be reunited. This suggests that Crimea is unique. The end of the Cold War was somewhat anticlimactic; there was no peace agreement, so no formal peace needed to be kept. However, instead of disbanding, NATO grew both its membership and its mandate. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime.
It has always been viewed through this lens, and the Euromaidan movement got a little too close for comfort. NATO became less interested in a destabilized Georgia. So the message delivered to Putin after was essentially that military force was an effective way to discourage Western interest. Moreover, this occurred under President George W.
Bush, who was famously unafraid to use military power to resolve complex problems. Regarding Ukraine, Putin was dealing with President Obama, who did not articulate a clear policy doctrine that made American intentions clear. Russian leaders have communicated their concerns about NATO expansion and missile defence systems in East-Central Europe repeatedly, but these have fallen on deaf ears.
Putin demonstrated the lengths to which Russia is prepared to go to protect its sphere of interest. Alexander Motyl has been highly critical of accusations made by prominent IR scholars, most famously by John J. Mearsheimer has rightly seized on a central concern that all three Russian presidents have expressed since the end of the Cold War: It is not necessary to employ a realist lens to see that the expansion of NATO eastward has contributed to the deterioration in relations with Russia.
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Motyl suggests that the appropriate lens is one that appreciates the ways in which Putin uses ideology and ideas to construct a Russian identity that counters Western influence and dominates the region. He aptly labels identity and ideology social constructions, the appreciation of which is essential to understanding Putin; however, the West—and NATO—factor into these considerations in important ways that Motyl is reluctant to recognize.
Ideology and its place in the political system of communism were much debated, particularly its impact on the content of policy, including foreign policy. What is. donnsboatshop.com: Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policy ( ): Rick Fawn: Books.
Russia finds NATO expansion threatening because post-Soviet Russia defines itself very much in terms of its relations with the West in general and the US more specifically, and because the remaining areas into which NATO considers expansion are considered by Russia to be culturally and ideationally important. It is worth considering indications that not all security-related decisions are eclipsed by a competitive geopolitical mindset toward the West.
He has in these areas favoured the de-escalation of conflict with the West.
But NATO expansion into its neighbourhood is perceived to jeopardize this. The concerns about Western encroachment continue. When Obama announced the stationing of US war planes in Estonia, his words in Tallinn were impactful: Russian leaders have consistently tried to resist or reverse the expansion of NATO, but may now have justified its growth.
David Benn is correct to note that perhaps expansion makes more sense today than at any time in the post-Cold War period, given the perceived threat that Russia presents. Therefore, despite the rationale that NATO has for its expansion, the move made little sense to those outside the West, and this added to the siege mentality already present in Moscow.
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This cannot be attributed to Russian actions alone. As noted above, the West has always figured prominently in Russian conceptions of its own power and status in the international realm. This influences how Russia views its legally sovereign neighbours as a lost component of its exceptional past. What can be constructed can also be deconstructed.
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As actions can influence ideas, and they have, the reverse is also true. With the end of the Cold War, the common Slavic state said to contain Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians was disbanded. Ukraine was the symbol of old Kievan Russian with its orthodox roots. However, rather than promoting a trans-ethnic culture which the EEU is said to represent , Byzantinism focuses on an entirely Russian orthodox culture, politically, economically, and socially statist, and it is this feature that makes people Russian, regardless of legal definitions of citizenship.
He purposefully raised the stakes for the West to defend Ukraine and it blinked, which he anticipated, because he knows Western leaders do not wish to escalate the conflict with Russia. Returning to the identity argument, however, Mankoff is critical of the alleged need for Russia to care for ethnic Russians abroad because he feels it has been used selectively. Mankoff suggests that Putin has manufactured this pan-Slavic identity argument to support his desire to assert Russian dominance in strategically important areas only, 95 not coincidentally in countries that have shown an interest in closer integration with Europe and toward which NATO, specifically, has made overtures.
Allison agrees that identity is not a persuasive rationale for taking parts of Ukraine by force, particularly when timing is considered. However, Allison strikes a tone similar to other analysts, unwilling to consider that Russian perceptions of a threat may be worth acknowledging. Putin has not changed his message since taking office in NATO —the West—has just failed to hear him.
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As further evidence that Putin has manufactured this issue about the vulnerability of Russian speakers in Ukraine, Allison offers the argument that, because this concern was not articulated under previous presidents, notably Yeltsin, when NATO expansion should have first become a concern to Russia, it is somehow negated. Russian identity was in flux, as stability was prioritized over constructing a national identity from the wreckage of the Soviet Union.
If we are to understand Russian foreign policy, it is essential to consider the motivations of Putin as he has himself articulated them. These ideas are encapsulated in his 18 March speech to the Russian Duma, following the Crimea referendum on re unification with Russia. Invoking the Kosovo precedent, Putin challenged the West, notably the US, for proclaiming the legality, upheld by the UN International Court of Justice, of the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, and then denouncing Crimea for doing the very same.
In fall , growing pressure from the Kremlin led Yanukovich to withdraw from a popular trade deal with the EU. This did little to stem popular protests, which continued through the February Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia. Shortly after the referendum in Crimea, Putin signed a decree recognizing Crimea as a sovereign and independent state. This has only exacerbated hostilities been Moscow and Western leaders. Prime Book Box for Kids. Routledge; 1 edition September 1, Language: Be the first to review this item Amazon Best Sellers Rank: Related Video Shorts 0 Upload your video.
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