Send Me an Assist Car! (A Peacekeeper and First Responders Guide to Salvation)

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Algeria, as the Bamako deal's main broker, assumed a lead role in monitoring implementation, but its attention has waned. The peace process is at risk of collapse, which could provoke another nationwide crisis. One option would be to raise the urgency of the situation in Mali at the January AU summit and push with regional powers for a more active UN role in monitoring and using its good offices to advance the peace process. Although neither Bamako nor the region show much appetite for a major course correction, further deterioration in could require it. A reset would allow all sides to air concerns, potentially include constituencies that are currently left out, revise the peace process and reboot its implementation.

The recent killings of security officials have provoked a heavy-handed offensive against the long-suffering Muslim Rohingya minority. The group behind the attacks, Harakah al-Yaqin HaY , is new, and its expertise suggests foreign training. But exaggerating its foreign ties would be a mistake — its targets and goals are for now local. They also risk radicalising sections of the Rohingya population, whose leaders have until now mostly eschewed violence, and creating conditions transnational groups can exploit.

The crisis is simultaneously political, economic and humanitarian. An unresolved political standoff pits a fractious multiparty opposition alliance against an increasingly authoritarian, military-backed government that has dismantled checks and balances and institutions that could help mediate. But thus far little suggests the government will restore constitutional rule or change its economic policy.

Oil output is declining sharply, the economy is collapsing, preventable diseases are spreading fast and refugees are already appearing in neighbouring countries. Risks include a chaotic default, a popular revolt or a coup that would install an outright military dictatorship.

Regional sensitivities have prevented the UN engaging in a meaningful way, but the gravity of the situation merits the Secretary-General or a newly appointed envoy playing some role. Wars can be prevented or mitigated by early, clear and well-designed political and diplomatic engagement. Yet policymakers are increasingly stretched by a myriad of global crises. After a period of relative calm, an upsurge of crises is testing the international system, pitting major powers and regional players against one another and highlighting the weaknesses of preventive diplomacy. Governments and international organisations were taken by surprise by the Arab uprisings in and slow to react to crises in South Sudan and the Central African Republic CAR in the years that followed.

Policymakers, stretched by the symptoms of this wave of instability, including mass displacement and the spread of transnational terrorism, struggle to focus on conflict prevention. Yet, preventive diplomacy is not necessarily dead. The Iranian nuclear deal, progress toward peace in Colombia and the high-level push to avoid election-related chaos in Nigeria in have been reminders of what intensive international engagement can deliver.

Its primary focus is on conflicts, like those in Ukraine and Syria, which directly involve outside powers. While classical inter-state conflicts remain rare, internationalised civil wars are a leading source of regional and global frictions. Building frameworks to address both the internal and external tensions that shape them is likely to be a recurrent challenge for big powers, regional players and multilateral organisations in the years ahead.

The first half of this report focuses on the internal drivers of recent and current crises. It argues that while it is exceedingly hard to identify specific triggers of future conflicts, it is possible to identify likely threats to peace and work out how they may play out if left unaddressed. It emphasises the need to understand the political dimensions of conflicts and, especially, the leaders and elites whose choices for or against violence are pivotal.

Grasping how such leaders make these decisions is essential for effective early warning, but it must be buttressed by much broader political analysis covering, inter alia, the dynamics of ruling parties, opposition groups and civil society, not just at the national but at all levels of society. Building anticipatory relations with all these actors constitutes a bedrock for effective early action by outside partners, once a crisis looks set to break.

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It is important, too, to grasp the politics and strategies of militaries and internal security forces in cases such as Egypt, or of non-state armed groups in chaotic environments like Libya. Local rebellions in Yemen, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo DRC , Pakistan and CAR, to name a few, have expanded unexpectedly and exponentially, causing widespread violence and overthrowing a number of governments. In the Middle East and Central and West Africa, conflicts frequently flow across borders, and regional powers simultaneously fuel conflicts and position themselves as peacemakers.

Ethnic groups such as the Kurds in the Middle East straddle multiple countries, while organised criminal networks and transnational extremist groups are not restricted to individual states. This means that experts engaged in early warning and early action must treat regional and wider international factors as integral to their conflict analysis and development of appropriate policy. In many crises it is necessary to look beyond established multilateral frameworks — important though these can be — and pull together case-specific groupings of states and institutions to manage a problem, or at least minimise frictions.

Sometimes neither formal nor ad hoc inter-governmental arrangements will be suitable: The remainder of the report reviews the means available for directly engaging in conflicts as they escalate or in anticipation of their outbreak. In addition to mediation and other diplomatic options such as deploying high-level envoys, tools include a range of coercive measures and incentives for peace. All have significant limitations and can worsen rather than alleviate crises if not well coordinated and aligned to a broader political strategy.

At least equal caution should be applied to the use of force. As the Arab intervention in Yemen has underlined, like many interventions before it, military action can prove costly and counterproductive. This caution also applies to deployments of military peace operations, which have become a standard part of international crisis management especially in Africa and increasingly tend toward more robust forms of peace enforcement.

While such missions can and do save lives, they can also become entangled in local conflicts, get bogged down in situations from which they have no exit strategy and become overly aligned with governments that do not always enjoy much popular support. Whatever direct or indirect means of engagement states use, they should set explicit and limited political goals and communicate these clearly to other actors including their opponents to avoid violence spiralling beyond control. While coercion may have a role to play in management of a specific crisis, it should be balanced with clear incentives for leaders, elites and their supporters to follow paths away from violence.

These may include aid for post-crisis demobilisation, governance reforms and reconstruction. More strategically, the best peace incentives that outsiders may be able to offer are ideas and advice to actors in a crisis on how to structure mutually-beneficial arrangements to share power and resources. In Libya, for example, the interest all sides ultimately have in a functioning energy sector could be a point of consensus even while political disputes create friction. No one group of analysts and forecasters is consistently right in its early warnings Crisis Group included , and no early action strategy is foolproof.

Tackling conflicts as they emerge and develop is an inherently chancy business, and governments and international organisations that engage in it inevitably risk failure. Nevertheless, early, strategic, well-designed engagement predicated on the discipline of close analysis, development of anticipatory relationships and framework diplomacy may help prevent conflict or limit its escalation.

To the extent that their resources permit, governments, regional bodies and international organisations should invest in four key areas:. Five years ago, the Arab uprisings exposed the weaknesses of existing models of early warning and early action in response to political crises. While many analysts were aware of the political, social and economic factors that led to the uprisings in early , few if any foresaw the wave of disorder that spread across North Africa and the Middle East.

Governments and international organisations resorted to a variety of policy tools — ranging from offers of mediation to economic sanctions and threats of international prosecution — that frequently failed to alter the calculations of embattled political elites. In many cases, their efforts backfired badly. While the United Nations UN Security Council mandated military action in Libya to protect civilians in March , the uprising against Muammar Qadhafi resulted in a fractured state that slid into chaos while outside powers focused elsewhere.

In Yemen, an initially successful UN mediation ran out of steam, paving the way for the Saudi-led intervention in Arguments over these crises also fuelled geopolitical confrontations, variously involving the West, Russia, China, and Arab and African powers, that have severely complicated later attempts at conflict management.

Fifteen Points for the New Secretary-General

Doubts about international crisis response have since been compounded, as conflicts have escalated from South Sudan to eastern Ukraine. In some cases, such as Mali and the Central African Republic CAR , analysts and officials saw crises escalate but did not react promptly or decisively. In others, as in Ukraine, the pace of events appeared to take outside actors by surprise.

By , the Uppsala Conflict Data Program UCDP has calculated, there were some 40 conflicts worldwide, eleven involving over 1, battle deaths a year: Donors have had to repurpose funds to handle the record numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons IDPs. International coalitions are trying to contain and rollback violent Islamist extremist groups in the Middle East and North Africa with a mix of military aid to both state and non-state actors, covert operations and airstrikes.

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These measures crowd out discussion of long-term conflict prevention and resolution. As UN officials have recently emphasised, the key to stemming the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East is not only to increase funding to aid agencies, but also to resolve the conflicts there. Crisis Group has argued that vital to countering the influence of groups like the Islamic State IS and al-Qaeda is to ratchet down regional confrontations, in particular the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran; redouble efforts to contain if not immediately resolve the conflicts these groups exploit; and work toward local solutions based on the inclusion, rather than alienation of vulnerable communities.

The strategic case for effective early warning tools and early action mechanisms to avert potential conflicts, or at least stop them from escalating and spreading into broader confrontations, seems clear enough. Even if governments pay lip service to such notions, many have resorted to covert or overt military actions to manage crises: While the bulk of current conflicts are intra-state wars, at least a third are internationalised — with foreign forces from one or more other countries in the fight — exacerbating regional and wider international tensions and rendering conflict resolution significantly more complex.

Yet, there is a daunting mix of obstacles to effective early international response. These range from understanding the implications of political frictions in peripheral areas of weak states, such as Mali, to the diplomatic challenges of forging international frameworks to handle cases like Syria.

Few if any of these challenges are unprecedented — for examples of the problems of volatile peripheral areas, one can go back to the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire a century ago — but addressing them requires sharp political insight, judgment and action that still often elude policymakers.

Using the Fruits While Surrounded by Nuts: Send Me an Assist Car Too!

In parallel with the deterioration of particular conflicts, the norms that have underpinned much post-Cold War thinking on conflict prevention and resolution are in flux. Even if political pluralism and representative government still offer the best hope of stability in most countries, the difficulties of democratisation are obvious.

Conflict prevention specialists are now as likely to emphasise the dangers associated with elections in fragile states as their advantages. The post-Cold War trend toward strengthening international justice, symbolised by the International Criminal Court, is also encountering increasing pushback. In Africa in particular, the African Union AU and sub-regional bodies repeatedly, if inconsistently, cite human security, prevention of mass atrocities and defence of legitimate governments to justify interventions.

West Africa , 14 April , p. This report maps out how governments and multilateral organisations can best respond to looming crises in this uneasy international environment. It begins by asking how relevant existing thinking about early warning and early action is today. It then explores recent lessons about drivers of conflict, including elite decision-making, localised violence and regional political factors.

Finally, it turns to the diplomatic tools, coercive measures and incentives typically available to policymakers trying to address crises and the strategic and diplomatic frameworks needed to put these tools to use. It is necessary to be realistic about the chances of halting fast-moving crises, but effective and rapid action is often possible. This report concentrates on early warnings of violent conflict and strategies of early action that external actors may take to address those risks. While acknowledging the value of long-term warnings, this paper takes a narrower view and focuses on medium- and short-term warnings and responses to political dynamics that have a clear potential to lead to violence.

This encompasses imminent threats and risks that may require some years to come to fruition. The precise timeline is less important than the presence of signs that leaders, political factions or other armed groups are taking steps that could ultimately lead to conflict. This focus on looming conflicts requires three qualifications. As noted in Section III below, officials and analysts should build relationships with political figures, civil society members and others who can promote non-violent solutions to a crisis.

The second qualification is that, while this report largely discusses emerging and escalating crises, it is essential to keep watch for unexpected developments in active and ongoing conflicts. Events such as the rise of IS in Syria in or the upsurge of violence in Ukraine in early can fundamentally transform the dynamics of an existing war. The detailed political and security analysis promoted below can and must continue even after a conflict explodes. Thirdly, it is necessary to ask who is best-placed to conduct this analysis and direct early action.

As Section IV emphasises, who does early warning and early action is increasingly complicated and contentious. When Crisis Group launched in the mids, the U. Today, a diverse array of often mutually mistrustful states, organisations and non-governmental groups are engaged.

The exact mix of relevant players differs from case to case. By taking a broad view of who can deal with crises and how, this paper points to some principles for such cooperation. A focus on political actors and analysis is in line with earlier studies that argued early engagement in crises must rest on an understanding of political dynamics. Stam and Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight Cambridge, A Dangerous Third Term , 20 May , pp. If diplomats or international officials want to engage in a country on the verge of conflict, they need not only to develop a sense of its underlying problems, but also to have a working knowledge of the interests and political calculations of the leaders, parties and factions involved.

Experts on early warning are often rightly wary of quantifying these issues: Some potential flashpoints, such as divisive elections or the death of an authoritarian leader, may have a high chance of engendering instability. What precipitates a conflict may be a sudden, unforeseen event: We can, however, still identify and assess the political factors that make a crisis more or less likely and explore how that crisis might play out. Through detailed information gathering and analysis, it is possible to show how the policies and strategies of leaders and other power-brokers are liable to raise tensions, destabilise societies and initiate conflicts.

It is feasible to foresee the political dividing lines that might emerge at trigger moments in the future. In some cases, this information also allows observers to estimate how the ensuing confrontations could unfold, if often only roughly, offering a spectrum of possible developments. A review of Crisis Group reports demonstrates the potential of such analysis to flag looming risks, even if it cannot identify precise triggers. At a time when the U. Bye-Bye Arusha , 25 October , p. These two cases show how focusing on the strategies and behaviour of leaders can help identify impending crises, even if those strategies and behaviours are informed by deeper contextual factors.

Where conflicts intensify, analysts may also be able to identify how short-term political developments may create instability and potentially reshape dynamics. The group did not initially appear to be a major spoiler, but military success turned it into a significant and ambitious political force in Elsewhere, early warnings have more successfully led to early action. Signals included increasing low-level sectarian attacks and local politicians arming followers in anticipation of worse to come.

Crisis Group advocated a high-level international push to persuade President Goodluck Jonathan and his opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, to renounce violence. Following intensive personal diplomacy by luminaries such as U. Research in the Niger Delta, a centre of his support, suggests that local leaders had been ready for violence. Revisiting the Niger Delta , 29 September , p. Crisis Group certainly does not always foresee future developments accurately: Nonetheless, good analysis-based early warning can identify not only the underlying risks of future conflicts, but also i how political actors are exacerbating the dangers of a crisis through their medium-term strategies; ii how shorter-term tactical developments may accelerate tensions; and iii what possible paths a conflict could take if not controlled.

The goal of early action is then to determine how to persuade or push actors to pursue alternative courses that avert or minimise violence, or, where the internationalisation of a conflict is a risk, at least contain it. While it is important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of specific tools, they can only rarely be utilised in isolation from each other. Optimally, such strategies should include a concept of a peaceful end-state to a crisis that all major players can buy into.

Jentleson, Opportunities Missed , Opportunities Seized: This long-term view must be factored into early action where possible, even if there is inevitably always a short-term focus on averting an immediate crisis. This is all hard. Even where concerned international actors have roughly similar strategic goals, it can be hard to match up their strategies. In , for example, Crisis Group warned that the Security Council risked undermining regional peace-making in South Sudan by threatening sanctions on six generals who actually favoured a settlement two were sanctioned, duly creating resentment.

This case underlines the advantage of close political analysis. The Council targeted the generals largely due to their positions; Crisis Group argued they were comparatively moderate due to their views. More daunting still, it is sometimes necessary to coordinate strategies with actors with deeply opposed views, as in recent efforts involving regional powers, Russia and the West in Syria. In such cases, it is impossible to distinguish neatly between mediators and parties to the conflict and strategic competitors and diplomatic collaborators.

If diplomats, analysts and international officials want to recognise warning signs of political dynamics that are liable to lead to violence, what should they look for? Nevertheless, Crisis Group reports highlight four recurrent sets of warning signs: It is essential to understand not only individual leaders but also the political currents around them. This involves understanding the political organisations, factions and elites that underpin any leader, as well as the strength and strategies of opposition groups and the wider constellation of local leaders, armed groups and other secondary players who might exploit a crisis.

The need to understand such secondary political actors was made clear in South Sudan in Civilian and military factions now jockeyed for control of the party, creating discontent in the army and threatening President Salva Kiir's grip on power.

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While symptoms of this struggle became increasingly public, UN and Western diplomats focused on working with Kiir. They arguably missed opportunities to engage with a wider range of actors and were caught badly off-guard when the country collapsed into war that December. Egypt has also highlighted the importance of tracking opposition and other interest group dynamics.

In more propitious circumstances, civil society and economic interest groups can act as restraints on violence. The National Dialogue Quartet a coalition of civil society groups with a strong popular base helped to avert a similar breakdown in Tunisia in Putting the Transition Back on Track , 23 September , p. Where there is high political polarisation and few domestic constraints on violence, leaders can easily initiate civil conflict by design or accident. Where political factions are intent on violence, civil society may only be able to mitigate the resulting conflict.

National Christian and Muslim leaders have, for example, called for peace throughout the CAR crisis but could not stop the deterioration in Some lower-level religious figures actually incited sectarian violence. Better Late Than Never , 2 December , p. This brief cross-section of cases shows that the best way to predict how crises may evolve is to have a clear picture of the politicians and factions at the centre of decision-making and that political drivers of violence must be analysed from a range of angles.

It can be helpful to focus on inflection points in political processes, such as elections or the date of a constitutionally-set term limit, which are likely to be polarising moments. Of course, analysts should not concentrate solely on such risky moments lest they miss other tensions and flashpoints.

It was relatively successful but arguably lulled many outsiders into a false security sense, so they did not track the ensuing deterioration closely enough. Thirdly, how opposition forces and civil society may fuel, defuse or mitigate a political crisis must be assessed. Conversely, they may take advantage of conflict abroad to strengthen their position at home, as Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have done in Ukraine. Egypt also highlights the need to monitor national security forces and militaries as sources of instability.

Yet, it is also necessary to recognise the dangers associated with security forces that have lost status and self-confidence post revolutionary Tunisia , lack cohesion to ward off internal and external enemies Iraq, , are not rooted as an established institution Libya or are linked to only part of society Syria. While outsiders often invest heavily in training and equipping militaries and security forces, their political dynamics tend to be poorly understood.

It is not enough to ask to what degree civilians formally control the military and security structures. In many states, relations between uniformed and civilian authorities are a matter of constant manoeuvre. Avoiding Escalation , 18 July , p. Elsewhere, security forces may act as forces for restraint in volatile situations: The Boko Haram Insurgency , 3 April , p.

What Next for Venezuela? The difficulties of assessing the intentions and capacities of formal military and security forces are often compounded by the proliferation of militias and informal armed groups with uncertain affiliations. In the event, Russia has kept a firm grip over these groups, but it is sometimes necessary to treat irregular and semi-regular armed groups as serious political actors, not marginalise them. A Dangerous Winter , 18 December , p. Studies of armed groups can link to another, often-overlooked challenge to weak states: The Priorities of the Transition , 11 June , p.

Similar threats have emerged in the peripheries of other weak states with highly destabilising results: An Existential Crisis , 4 April War in Blue Nile , 18 June ; and , Sudan: Preserving Peace in the East , 26 November It is often hard for diplomats and international officials in capitals or further afield to get a clear picture of developments in peripheral regions.

The Inner Abroad , 30 June , pp. Politically and culturally symbolic sites are potential flashpoints: A focus on national leaders, political factions, security politics and peripheral conflicts can give outside observers a clearer understanding of the chains of events that may destabilise a government or create conditions for violence. Moscow used ethnic Russian concerns in Ukraine to legitimise its incursions in The Priorities , op.

Strains within security forces and between uniformed and civilian leaders in a fragile country may also be exacerbated by external threats. Terrorism and Regional Polarisation , 21 October , p. Transnational criminal networks frequently exacerbate instability in other vulnerable regions. The Guatemala-Honduras Border , 4 June , p.

The activities of cross-border political movements, bound together by ethnicity, faith or strategic calculations, can also easily result in spillover conflicts. However, policymakers now tend to prioritise two facets of the internationalisation of conflict: Given the prominence of these trends in diplomatic discourse, it is worth testing their importance. There is no doubt that jihadist groups have played a brutal part in recent conflicts in the Arab world, in addition to instigating and inspiring terrorist acts globally. In Mali, Libya and Yemen, IS, al-Qaeda or other extremist movements have taken advantage of existing instability to seize territory.

It would be foolish to argue these groups are not a serious threat in many regions. Their presence vastly complicates efforts to end conflicts, given the increasing military potency of some of them and that their aspirations and ideology are hard to envisage as part of a political settlement; in any case, few show much interest in peace processes.

Applying a counter-terrorism lens to such cases risks stigmatising members of disadvantaged communities as potential extremists, reducing the chance to solve their underlying grievances. Equally, there is nothing new about outside powers engaging in proxy warfare, subversion and direct intervention in long-suffering states such as Yemen. The Implementation of Peace Agreements Boulder, Getting Geneva Right , 26 February , p.

This report considers how governments and international organisations may be able to manage such complicated tensions around future conflicts. Yet, the divisions that have sprung up around these cases are not simply the product of chance or bad policy. Much thinking on these issues dates from the first ten to fifteen post-Cold War years, when Western analysts presumed sometimes optimistically that the U. While Washington retains far more power to play a guiding role in managing conflicts than any other state, the geopolitical context is shifting: The preceding pages have laid out a series of issues that should interest analysts and policymakers looking for signs of looming crises.

Policymakers and analysts need to combine tracking these issues with other indicators, such as economic trends, to strengthen their understanding of potential risks. Optimally, this should include channels for frank communication with leaders on choices and strategies. Outsiders who build close ties with authoritarian leaders can, however, become over-entangled with them. It argued that donors should tie some aid to government efforts to improve this. However, it is important to recognise the stakes many actors have in stymying reforms and potential political repercussions.

In some cases, outsiders may be better advised to focus on supporting civil society groups and other unofficial actors who may help constrain violence, but doing so requires considerable time, and may meet high-level political opposition. Given the mixed chances of success of such preventive actions, it is necessary to consider the tools that external actors can bring to bear on crises as they escalate.

Successful early action consists of steps — including efforts to facilitate a political process, coerce key actors or create incentives for peace — that may open paths to a sustainable settlement of a crisis. A sustainable settlement may range from tweaking the status quo in an unstable country to make it acceptable to all sides, through steps such as limited political reforms, to a large-scale rebalancing of power, including constitutional changes and leadership transitions.

Outsiders must tread carefully when pursuing these goals. All early action involves engaging in fluid political environments. There is a high chance of political friction, with misunderstandings and miscalculations derailing plans. No form of crisis response is neutral. Domestic actors will always perceive outsiders as biased. In some cases they will still welcome engagement as a means to secure their own goals, resolve complex policy issues or minimise violence; in others, they may decide to misuse such help, for example by extending political talks indefinitely.

Pathways outsiders want to help devise to avoid or curtail violence must be based on appreciation of what local factors will accept. In country-focused Crisis Group reports in the first third of , 61 per cent of recommendations were aimed at governments or domestic political actors.

External actors often appear unable to do more than encourage contacts to behave responsibly. When it comes to complex steps needed to unravel many crises — reducing political influence over institutions, for example, or reining in security services — even the best-placed outsider usually lacks the insights or contacts to do more than nudge national leaders to act. There are also constraints on external actors in most cases.

Policymakers who consider engaging in an escalating conflict assess whether it is in their own interests to expend the resources and take the risks. Internal political issues and competing bureaucratic priorities may militate against acting, even when good policy options are available. This report does not reflect at length on these problems, but it is essential to keep in mind that even when decision-makers want to launch early action to end a crisis abroad, they do not have infinite resources.

In the current context of internationalised conflicts, policymakers face a further layer of dilemmas: The trend toward states acting as both combatants and peacemakers Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Russia and the U. There is a broader diffusion of conflict prevention and peacemaking responsibilities, with new powers, ambitious regional organisations and non-governmental actors taking roles that might once have been filled by the U. New actors may vary as markedly in strength and style as China and Chad. China often appears tentative in crises outside its immediate Asia-Pacific area, even if it has been increasingly prominent in Afghan affairs since NATO drew down its main force there in Between Ambition and Fragility , 30 March , p.

Regional and sub-regional organisations have, meanwhile, increasingly attempted to take primary responsibility for conflict issues in their own areas. These actors often enjoy clear advantages of legitimacy and local contacts, but internal political divisions and capacity gaps can hold them back. Human Rights Council Thirty-ninth session 10—28 September Agenda item 10 Technical assistance and capacity-building. Every State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from the four mass atrocity crimes Pillar I. The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual States in meeting that responsibility Pillar II.

A service provided by. ReliefWeb has been the leading online source for reliable and timely humanitarian information on global crises and disasters since Learn more about ReliefWeb. We have just rebuilt the mobile version of our website. You may remember that a while back we launched ReliefWeb Lite in a bid to better meet the needs of users in low-bandwidth countries. Skip to main content. South Sudan Logistics Cluster: Floods - Sep East Africa: Armyworm Infestation - Mar South Sudan: Cholera Outbreak - Jul South Sudan: Food Insecurity - South Sudan: Measles Outbreak - Mar South Sudan: Kala-azar Outbreak - Sep South Sudan: Floods - Aug South Sudan: Cholera Outbreak - May South Sudan: Measles Outbreak - Sep Humanitarian Snapshot August Without peace deal, scorched-earth tactics and civilian suffering will continue Commission on Human Rights Urges South Sudan to make peace and justice a reality.

Refine the results by adding specific criteria. Select a category , then start typing a word to see the suggestions. Click or press enter to select the suggestion. Once finished, click "Apply options" to launch the search. Government troops and militias given free rein to commit new atrocities The staggering brutality of a recent military offensive in South Sudan - including murder of civilians, systematic rape of women and girls and massive looting and destruction - was fuelled by the authorities' failure to prosecute or remove suspected war criminals, Amnesty International said in a new report today.

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Send Me an Assist Car!: A Peacekeeper and First Responders Guide to Salvation

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