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This systematic presentation, using scholarly analysis and a practitioner's inside knowledge, provides a readable and challenging text for courses on the United Nations. Following service in the U. Would you like to tell us about a lower price? If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? Learn more about Amazon Prime.
Read more Read less. Customers who viewed this item also viewed. Page 1 of 1 Start over Page 1 of 1. Europe's Crises and the Fate of the West. Living with the UN: Praeger; 2 edition September 30, Language: Related Video Shorts 0 Upload your video. Share your thoughts with other customers. Write a customer review. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. He has worked alongside several UN Secretary-Generals. So I feel he is well qualified to know what he is talking about. Sutterlin writes directly and with an authorative style on the UN's role in maintaining the balance of peace, in an often troubled world.
He opens this book by acknowledging that with the end of the Cold War, the world has entered a new era in International relations and thus; security and peace issues that need to be confronted are now more complex than ever before. His book looks at prevention of conflict, the use of military forces to enforce peace; stopping aggressive actions of states, building of peace and the emergence of terrorism and issues of weapons of mass destruction. The book also discusses the emergence of regional organisations such as: Sutterlin concludes his excellent book by examining the post of the UN Secretary-General; with an informative insight into what has been described as the world's most difficult job.
In summary a first class book, which examines the various operations and involvement of the UN with international security. The author questions does the UN need to reassess itself in an ever-changing world? The world of today is, or course, completely different to the world of 63 years ago, when the UN first commenced its work. This book is an excellent reference for the student of the United Nations and its work with international security. Full of references and a good bibliography. The book was written in and a new, third edition would be welcome.
Well done, James Sutterlin! The principle involved in preserving the balance of power as a conscious goal of foreign policy, as David Hume pointed out in his Essay on the Balance of Power , is as old as history, and was used by Greeks such as Thucydides both as political theorists and as practical statesmen.
It resurfaced in Renaissance among the Italian city-states in the 15th century.
Francesco Sforza , Duke of Milan , and Lorenzo de' Medici , ruler of Florence , were the first rulers actively to pursue such a policy, with the Italic League , though historians have generally [ citation needed ] attributed the innovation to the Medici rulers of Florence. Universalism , which was the dominant direction of European international relations prior to the Peace of Westphalia , gave way to the doctrine of the balance of power. The term gained significance after the Treaty of Utrecht in , where it was specifically mentioned. It was not until the beginning of the 17th century, when the science of international law assumed the discipline of structure, in the hands of Grotius and his successors, that the theory of the balance of power was formulated as a fundamental principle of diplomacy.
In accordance with this new discipline, the European states formed a sort of federal community , the fundamental condition of which was the preservation of a balance of power, i. And, since all were equally interested in this settlement, it was held to be the interest, the right , and the duty of every power to interfere, even by force of arms, when any of the conditions of this settlement were infringed upon, or assailed by, any other member of the community. This balance-of-power principle, once formulated, became an axiom of political science. Frederick the Great , in his Anti-Machiavel , proclaimed the 'balance of power' principle to the world.
In Friedrich von Gentz re-stated it with admirable clarity, in Fragments on the Balance of Power.
This extensively revised edition retains the valuable descriptions and analyses of the United Nations' achievements and failures, while placing them in the context of the ever-broadening definition of international security and of changing attitudes toward national sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Leicester University Press, , p African Union Union for the Mediterranean. Retrieved from " https: I wish that all nations may recover and retain their independence; that those which are overgrown may not advance beyond safe measure of power, that a salutary balance may ever be maintained among nations and that our peace, commerce, and friendship, may be sought and cultivated by all Cornell University Press, American Political Science Association, September 2—4, , http:
During the greater part of the 19th century, the series of national upheavals which remodeled the map of Europe obscured the balance of power. Yet, it underlaid all the efforts of diplomacy to stay, or to direct, the elemental forces of nationalism let loose by the French Revolution. In the revolution's aftermath, with the restoration of comparative calm, the principle once more emerged as the operative motive for the various political alliances, of which the ostensible object was the preservation of peace. Regarding the last quarter-century of the period outlined by Taylor, his American colleague, diplomatic historian Edward Mead Earle , argued: Since , the arguments of Streit and Earle has prevailed over that of Taylor.
Atomic scientists launched an all-out attack on the balance-of-power concept:. The balance-of-power system is discredited today. References to it, even by professional historians and international lawyers, commonly imply either that it was a system for war which repeatedly failed or that it was a system for making war which often succeeded in its purpose … During the period of its dominance as a European system, say, to , its record in preventing war was certainly not striking.
Indeed, it probably was itself responsible for starting more wars than it prevented. Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer interpreted the core of the concept of Europe after as the rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in Europe has a basic choice: Our choice is clear: It has been argued by historians that, in the sixteenth century, England came to pursue a foreign policy which would preserve the equilibrium between Spain and France, which evolved into a balance-of-power policy:.
The continental policy of England [after ] was fixed. It was to be pacific, mediating, favorable to a balance which should prevent any power from having a hegemony on the continent or controlling the Channel coasts. Thomas Carlyle referred to statesmen "in shadow-hunting, shadow-hunted hour Statesman Richard Cobden labeled balance of power "a chimera" due to its unclear meaning: Instead, for centuries "Europe has with only just sufficient intervals to enable the combatants to recruit their wasted energies been one vast and continued battle-field…" [19] He criticized Lord Bacon for his adherence to the balance of power as a universal rule:.
As for the rule of Lord Bacon: It would reduce us even below the level of animals… [T]his rule would, if acted upon universally, plunged us into a war of annihilation … nor would the leveling strife cease until either the rule were abrogated, or mankind had been reduced to the only pristine possessions—teeth and nails! Sir Esme Howard wrote that England adopted the balance of power as "a cornerstone of English policy, unconsciously during the sixteenth, subconsciously during the seventeenth, and consciously during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because for England it represented the only plan of preserving her own independence, political and economic".
The size of the units which count effectively in international politics grows steadily larger. There is no longer room in Europe today for those three or four important and strong countries whose more or less equal rivalries enabled Great Britain in the past to secure herself through the policy of the balance of power.
Much nonsense has been talked in recent years about the balance of power. But the confusion of thought resulting from the attempt to brand it as a morally reprehensive policy has been less serious than the confusion resulting from the assumption that it is a policy which can be applied at all times and in all circumstances. The principal military reason why … is that the balance of power in Europe has hopelessly broken down The possibility of restoring the balance did not exist after ; and British policy, based on a false premise, ended in disaster.
In , Winston Churchill was criticized by his rival, Adolf Hitler , for his adherence to the balance of power:. Churchill is a man with an out-of-date political idea—that of the European balance of power. It no longer belongs to the sphere of realities. And yet it's because of this superstition that Churchill stirred England up to war.
On another occasion he added: Without the Wehrmacht , a "wave would have swept over Europe that would have taken no care of the ridiculous British idea of the balance of power in Europe in all its banality and stupid tradition—once and for all. In fact, Churchill shortly adopted a similar view: Our Russian friends and Allies, he spoke in , most admire strength and least respect military weakness. We cannot afford … to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.
On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security. In an attempt to disprove the balance of power theory, some realists have pointed to cases in international systems other than modern Europe where balancing failed and a hegemon arose. William Wohlforth , Richard Little and Stuart Kaufman, point to the failure of state like units to balance against Assyria in the first millennium BCE; the Hellenic successor states of Alexander the Great to balance against Rome ; the Warring States to balance against the Qin dynasty in ancient China and five other cases.
Any significant counterexample falsifies the universal claim; eight such examples demolish it. Wohlforth, Little and Kaufman state that systemic hegemony is likely under two historically common conditions: First when the rising hegemon develops the ability to incorporate and effectively administer conquered territories. And second, when the boundaries of the international system remain stable, and no new major powers emerge from outside the system.
In fact, balance-of-power systems have existed only rarely in history. Most states systems have ended in the universal empire, which has swallowed all the states of the system. The examples are so abundant that we must ask two questions: Is there any states system which has not led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire?
Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect any states system to culminate in this way? Still earlier, Quincy Wright , concluded on the balance of power in world history:. The predominance of the balance of power in the practice of statesmen for three centuries … should not obscure the fact that throughout world history periods dominated by the balance-of-power policies have not been the rule.
of International Security: A Challenge to be Met, 2nd Edition (): The United Nations and the Maintenance of International S and millions of . Following service in the U.S. Army during World War II, Sutterlin entered the. published its final report The UN Trust Fund for Human Security was established in it is a challenge, what areas of international law are affected? Do we wish . led to a vivid discussion among scholars and has met with approval and . second fundamental concept in the charter, the protection of human rights, as.
The balance of power scarcely existed anywhere as a conscious principle of international politics before … [31]. Balance of power systems have in the past tended, through the process of conquest of lesser states by greater states, towards reduction in the number of states involved, and towards less frequent but more devastating wars, until eventually a universal empire has been established through the conquest by one of all those remaining.
The post-Cold War period represents an anomaly to the balance of power theory too. Rousseau defined the theoretical limit how far balance of power can be altered: These three potentates, whoever they may be, will not possess half the power of all Europe. In , US military expenditures, including supplemental spending, exceeded those of the rest of the world combined. Since , the founder of Neorealism , Kenneth Waltz , confessed that "the present condition of international politics is unnatural.
Elsewhere, Richard Little wrote: Events since the end of the Cold War "create a potential anomaly" for the theory because the outcome has "left the United States as the sole superpower in a unipolar world A major puzzle for realists Paul , Jack S. Sacko and Terry Narramore: To date, at least, there is little sign of a serious effort to forge a meaningful anti-American alliance From the traditional perspective of balance-of-power theory, this situation is surely an anomaly.
Power in the international system is about as unbalanced as it has ever been, yet balancing tendencies are remarkably mild. It is possible to find them, but one has to squint pretty hard to do it. Contrary to realist predictions, unipolarity has not provided the global alarm to restore a balance of power. Resistance has in fact appeared and may be growing.
But it is remarkable that despite the sharp shifts in the distribution of power, the other great powers have not yet responded in a way anticipated by balance-of-power theory. Historically, major powers have rarely balanced against the United States and not at all since the s when it has become the sole superpower. Traditional balance of power theory … fails to explain state behavior in the post-Cold War era.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been expanding its economic and political power. More recently, it has begun to engage in increasingly unilateralist military policy… [Y]et despite these growing material capabilities, major powers such as China, France, Germany, India, and Russia have not responded with significant increases in their defense spending.
Nor have they formed military coalitions to countervail US power, as the traditional balance of power theory would predict. Whether or not realists got the Cold War right, they have most certainly got the warm peace wrong. A decade after the Berlin Wall collapsed… their dark vision of the future has not come to pass. Most importantly, despite its continued predominance and political activism, and the first rumbling of international opposition in response to missteps in Kosovo, no coalition has emerged to balance against it … [T]he United States today defies the supposedly immutable laws of realpolitik.
The persistence of American unipolar predominance in the international system since the end of the Cold War has caused a rupture in the American school of Realist … theory Yet the ongoing failure of potential rivals to the US, such as China, Russia, or the EU to develop military capabilities that come anywhere close to those of the US seems to have defied this prediction.
Despite the apparently radical imbalance of the international political system, smaller states are not trying to build up their military power to match that of the US or forming formal alliance systems to oppose it… The absence of balancing against the US constitutes a serious anomaly for neorealist theory. Fareed Zakaria asks, "Why is no one ganging up against the United States? Owen ask the same question. Do the weak always unite against the strong? There is no counterbalance. The balance of power theory is a core tenet of both classical and neorealist theory and seeks to explain alliance formation.
Due to the neorealist idea of anarchism as a result of the international system, states must ensure their survival through maintaining or increasing their power in a self-help world. With no authority above the state to come to its rescue in the event of an attack by a hegemon , states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon from arising by balancing against it.
According to Kenneth Waltz , founder of neorealism, "balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: States happy with their place in the system are known as "status quo" states, while those seeking to alter the balance of power in their favor are generally referred to as "revisionist states" and aspire for hegemony, thus repairing the balance.
States choose to balance for two reasons. Secondly, joining the weaker side increases the likelihood that the new member will be influential within the alliance. Realists claim that balancing is when states ally against the prevailing threat and results in a more secure world whereas in a bandwagoning world security is scarce as rising hegemons are not kept in check. The weaker the state the more likely it is to bandwagon than to balance as they do little to affect the outcome and thus must choose the winning side. Strong states may change a losing side into a winning side and thus are more likely to balance.
States will be tempted to bandwagon when allies are unavailable, however excessive confidence in allied support encourages weak states to free ride relying on the efforts of others to provide security. Since bandwagoning "requires placing trust in the aggressors continued forbearance" some realists believe balancing is preferred to bandwagoning. Chain-ganging occurs when a state sees its own security tied to the security of its alliance partner.
This is another aspect of the balance of power theory, whereby the smaller states could drag their chained states into wars that they have no desire to fight. Thus states "may chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be indispensable to the maintenance of the balance". John Mearsheimer , a prominent offensive realist , claims that threatened states can take four measures to facilitate buck passing, including: In the case that a state is an enemy with both the aggressor and the intended buck-catcher, a buck-passer can implement a bait and bleed strategy whereby the state causes two rivals to engage in a protracted war while the baiter remains on the sideline.
A potential drawback of the strategy occurs if the buck-catcher fails to check the aggressor, as the buck-passer will be in a much more vulnerable situation. After eliminating France the Germans had no Western front to divide their forces, allowing them to concentrate their forces against the USSR. Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur as other powers would build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition.
Offensive realists accept that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes, however, they maintain that balancing is often inefficient and that this inefficiency provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries. Offensive realists believe that internal balancing measures such as increasing defense spending, implementing conscription, are only effective to a certain extent as there are usually significant limits on how many additional resources a threatened state can muster against an aggressor.
The balance of threat theory is an offshoot of the balancing, coined in by Stephen M. Walt in an attempt to explain why balancing against rising hegemons has not always been consistent in history. In contrast to traditional balance of power theorists, Walt suggests that states balance against threats, rather than against power alone.
Power is one of the factors that affect the propensity to balance, although it is not the only one nor always the most important. Soft balancing was developed in the s to cope with the current anomaly of the unipolar unbalanced world. Thomas Mowle and David Sacko describe "soft balancing" as "balancing that does not balance at all.