The U.S. Submarine Production Base: An Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Struc

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It provides a chronological overview and background to the judgements made in this section. Complex project management is seldom done well. Research by an international management consultancy firm, involving some protects, found that only 10 per cent performed better than expected and around 50 per cent failed to achieve their objectives.

Experience indicates that 90 per cent of the discretionary decisions that affect the outcome of a project are made in the first 7 to 12 per cent of its life. In reality, before the contract to develop and build the submarines was awarded to Kockums, the future of the program was largely decided. One of the decisions most crucial in the outcome of the Collins submarine program was that to build it in Australia. This was an objective of the program as it first emerged in the context of the Budget and was pursued throughout the program's life.

A major RAN objective for any new submarine was to reduce the cost of operating the boats. It had rudely discovered the cost of submarine ownership early in its operation of the Oberons, when the refit of the first submarine cost 76 per cent of its purchase price. The RAN had already decided that local refit and maintenance of submarines as had been done with the Oberons rather than sending them back to an overseas builder , was required if the Service's submarine warfare potential was to remain fully credible, since adequate support demonstrated the naval viability of its submarines.

Analysis of the requirements to support effective submarine operations showed that a high proportion of the initial capital costs of any new program would have to be allocated to this area, integrated logistics support. Expenditure for this purpose was calculated to constitute about 25 to 30 per cent of the total capital cost of the program. Most integrated logistics support was better supplied from local sources than purchased overseas.

Operating the submarines successfully required this high degree of initial investment and an ongoing level of specialised industrial capacity. It seemed to Navy's planners that substantial advantages could be achieved through having the boats both built and maintained by the same organisation. Local construction would also provide the additional benefits of new technologies transferred to Australian industry and the broadening of the nation's economic base. Navy's position received political support from the earliest moments of the project. To gauge the possibilities for Australian industrial participation in the project, the then Minister for Defence Support organised a briefing session for Australian companies.

This occurred on 1 March , with personnel from more than Australian companies attending. At this stage was hoped that more than 50 per cent of the value of the project would be supplied by Australian industry. Following further work with industry, the production element of the program's procurement strategy became the construction of the first vessel overseas with the remaining five built in Australia.

It was not only the Commonwealth which supported strongly local submarine construction. State Governments were so anxious to have the construction site located within their boundaries that they established offices within their bureaucracies with the sole task of securing the program. One Premier, John Bannon of South Australia, went to the extent of having himself winched from a helicopter onto the deck of a submarine. The reason for such activity was that, by , Australia was in a severe recession which was particularly damaging to the older manufacturing regions of Victoria and South Australia.

The new submarine project was seen not only as a source of employment and a supplement for lost revenue, but as an opportunity to inject new technology which might revitalises the industrial base of the State fortunate enough to host the project. There were two significant consequences of the decision to build the new submarines in Australia. The first affected the terms and conditions under which the submarine was to be built, the second influenced the criteria on which the successful design would be selected.

The Contract a Result of the s Procurement Environment. Major procurement projects usually do not escape the management environment of the period in which they occur. In retrospect, they saw it as being too inflexible and enshrining an inherent conflict between builder and customer. However it is unlikely that the program would have proceeded if the fixed-price approach had not been adopted. The Influence of a Succession of Disasters. At the time of the development of the new submarine project the performance of defence procurement in Australia had consistently approached the disastrous.

The Coalition Government had approved a number of locally sourced defence equipment programs. For the RAAF it approved the design and construction in Australia of the Service's next generation of training aircraft. None of these projects was to prove satisfactory. The minehunters failed to perform to expectations and the program was later cancelled with only two built. The inadequacies of the FFG program prompted studies of restructuring options for the Government-owned dockyards in which they were being built.

The support vessel was delivered three years late and at three times the cost of building her in a French yard. The aircraft project was to be cancelled before it had flown. Fixed-price Contracting as an Apparent Solution. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the RAN sought a completely different approach to building defence equipment in Australia.

At the time, the fixed-price structure eventually preferred for the contract seemed the best approach to avoid the then current problems of defence procurement. That the terms and conditions of the contract eventually would come to be held sacrosanct, and obstruct Navy and the shipbuilder from negotiating sensible changes indicated by experience, would later prove significant.

However, this was not the problem that seized the attention of program managers in the s. It was not surprising that their favoured solution, in seeking to demonstrate to government that pressing current problems could be avoided, should have given perhaps too little consideration to mechanisms for modifying contractual agreements.

These became an issue much later, when correction of production defects became a problem. The nature of the fixed-price contract was not simply due to poor contract definition but to the need to find a credible way of implementing the agreement of all parties, that local production was central to the procurement strategy for the new submarines. Industrial Credibility as a Selection Imperative. Deciding to build the submarines in Australia had profound consequences for the criteria used to select the winning tenderer.

Companies responding to the Request for Proposals were required to provide detailed proposals for the involvement of Australian industry. This was probably the earliest stage in the evaluation of major defence equipment at which industrial proposals from overseas suppliers had been considered.

It is difficult to identify a major ADF capability before the Collins where the short list of the preferred tenderers for final selection of equipment was determined with such reference to factors additional to those of military performance. Obviously, having a contractor tied to fixed-price conditions would be of little use if the builder lacked the competence to deliver.

Further, the test of competence was to be more severe than usual because of the circumstances of the time. Until then, the RAN's usual experience in buying major warships was to build them in its own yards or to buy them overseas. Most of the existing Australian shipyards that were large enough to build submarines suffered from inefficiencies caused by poor industrial relations, under-utilised capacity, antiquated equipment or a combination of each.

Consequently, the company which was to be selected to provide the submarines was seen as needing to be less of a traditional shipbuilder and more of a project manager. These considerations were made explicit by Commodore Oscar Hughes when he was appointed to lead the new submarine project in He stated that the eventual winner of the contest would be the group with the best balance of 'capability, industrial involvement and cost'. Lobbying in Favour of Industrial Capability. Risk in a contractor's capacity to transfer construction to Australian industry equated to risk of embarrassment to the governments strongly identified with Australian production of the submarines.

With the extensive involvement of State Governments, lobbying for their participation in the program, there was unprecedented pressure emphasising industrial outcomes in the final selection of the submarines. Nor did the States merely advance their claims for the siting of the construction facility.

The South Australian submarine task force was particularly active, sending study teams overseas and reporting to the then Department of Defence Support. The South Australians noted that none of the other contenders were, at the time, fully operational in these. It appears that some of the competitors for the submarine contract, particularly the more traditional builders, were not ready for this change in emphasis. A consequence is that a design offering superior performance but with poor industrial credibility may have been rejected in the early stages of the new submarine selection.

It was certainly the case of the latter of two French bids, offering a nuclear powered boat. This is not to argue that the performance of the Collins submarines does not meet Australia's requirements indeed the opposite is suggested below. Perhaps some of the problems that were later to affect the design, such as underwater noise at high-speed, might have been avoided more easily by another designer. That, however, was not the sole objective of the program. The subsequent cost of modifying the hull to overcome this problem might be seen as one of the likely consequences and one acceptable in context of the fundamental strategy of building submarines in Australia.

Of the early decisions in the Collins program, the one which was to have the most public effect was that concerning the nature of the vessels' Combat Data System CDS. It has been the subsequent failure of this system to meet its design requirements that has left the submarines with a severely impaired combat capability.

The design of the Collins CDS has been described as dated and inflexible and the management of its software development process has been criticised. Yet the concept for the CDS was developed to avoid such problems. It was a decision mandating the architecture of the future system, made very early in the life of the program, rather than the subsequent management of its development that proved to be the source of subsequent difficulties.

Origins of the CDS Concept. One of the fundamental early decisions made by Navy was that the CDS would be developed separately and supplied under a different contract from that covering construction of the submarines. By the end of , it had decided that the electronic combat systems of the new boats would be fully integrated.

Instead of the then standard central computer performing all data analysis, the new submarine CDS would use a data bus to distribute information to a number of smaller computer work stations. Each of these would be capable of acquiring and processing information from whichever of the submarine's sensors was relevant to the current task. This philosophy of distributed processing was expected to improve operational effectiveness and to reduce the lifetime maintenance costs.

The latter would result from eliminating the need to cut open the submarines during modernisation programs to remove a bulky mainframe computer, with the system being upgraded instead by substituting new software. In January , in what was in fact the first step to involve industry with the project, Navy took advertisements calling for registration of interest from suppliers of 'modern integrated combat systems'.

The design of the new submarine would have to be capable of accommodating the independently developed CDS. As experience was soon to prove, few were. Difficulties in Selecting a Supplier. It was the development of the CDS which also provided the first signs of problems. Despite receiving responses from 5 consortia, no proposal would meet easily the requirements developed by Navy.

The most favoured proposal used technology developed for Royal Navy nuclear powered submarines. Not surprisingly, it was reported as costing more than program financial calculations had allowed-to the extent that it would consume approximately 60 per cent of the total project cost, rather than the 40 per cent which had been allocated. This company had earlier been selected to provide the combat avionics system for the RAN's Seahawk helicopters. The Seahawk system also used a distributed architecture experience with which, it was expected, would assist the development of the Collins system.

Kockums, the submarine constructor, was more familiar with the latter company and preferred it to be the subcontractor to provide the CDS. Navy however stuck to its strategy and awarded the CDS to Rockwell. In September , when Rockwell's inability to produce a satisfactory system had become a significant risk to the viability of the program, ASC was prevented from placing it in default of its contract and effectively lost control of the CDS sub-contract.

Early Assumptions and Subsequent Failure. The RAN was not alone in its 'grand folly'. When building the submarines in Australia first had been suggested, most doubt over the proposal's feasibility had centred on the heavy engineering requirements. The Australian information technology IT industry assured the RAN of both the feasibility and inherent advantages of a fully integrated combat system and of its ability to contribute to such a program.

More concern was felt at the risk involved in the engineering aspects of the program and some other areas of IT, such as the automated submarine control system. It appears that Rockwell itself did not consider the development of a fully integrated combat system as a task it might fail.

In the early s it appears to have devoted some effort in promoting the CDS as a means of upgrading existing conventional submarines, particularly the Russian-built Kilo class. Moreover, the RAN was not the only navy to think that the future of combat data processing lay with fully integrated systems. These were latter to prove helpful in providing the equipment that allowed an interim system to be installed in HMA Ships Dechaineux and Sheean.

Instead, Navy sought to preserve this part of its procurement strategy when clear evidence suggested it had failed. Navy's stubborn persistence with the CDS was the more surprising because, in the central area of the program, it quickly abandoned its approach to the development of the program's submarine platform component. At about two years into the life of the program, Navy changed the basis for evaluating the suitability of possible submarine designs. Original Low Risk Approach.

Recognising that the priority given to building the submarines in Australia entailed a high degree of risk, Navy sought to manage risk in the program as a whole by reducing that associated with the design of the submarine and its technologies. When Request for Tender RFT documents were issued to industry in May , the requirements for the new submarine emphasised tried and proven designs.

Navy stipulated that the selected design should be one already in-service or intended to be in-service by This would have minimised risk as sea trials would be under way in the parent navy. As a minimum, any designs submitted should be a derivative of submarines with an already proven service performance. Any modification to meet RAN requirements were to be of low risk and cost.

Opting for the Ideal Rather Than the Available. However, the RAN was in no way simply seeking to find the best available design. Issued with the RFT was a comprehensive list of specifications detailing the performance the RAN wanted from its new submarine. These reflected the expectations of Navy that it should be capable of considerable improvements over the Oberon class. Thus, Navy hoped that then established submarine design had advanced considerably.

When the responses of the competing companies were submitted by the end of it was apparent that the two objectives of proven design and advanced technology were in conflict. No existing design could meet the RAN's expectations. For the same reason, they were probably unable to provide sufficient engine compartment space and battery storage to allow significant improvements in submerged endurance and indiscretion ratio. The main reason for this was that European boats were designed to sustain a deployment to a distance of about two-thirds that required by the RAN.

At this point Navy made the crucial decision of the Collins class program. Instead of persisting with its procurement strategy and choosing the best available combination of design, industrial package and cost, Navy chose to proceed with developing a boat which more closely matched its ideal specifications. Cost Escalation and Program Delay.

This involved a delay of more than a year 36 and greatly increased the overall cost of the program. At the end of this period of recasting the project's nature, from the end of until May when the two contractors to compete for the final design were announced, costs grew by around 73 per cent over those expected when responses were first sought from industry. This was the period of greatest proportional cost growth during the history of the program and also confirmed a reduction in the number of boats it would purchase.

Prices are at then current levels, unless specified otherwise. Coincident with the cost escalation was an increase in risk across all segments of the program. This simply increased the probability that, at sometime, some of section of the program would not proceed as expected. Yet, despite these significant changes, Navy did not alter its procurement strategy. In retrospect, at this point it would have been appropriate to implement what Navy now recognises should have been done, and decide to build the first boat as a prototype that could have been used as a test bed to eliminate the almost inevitable failures.

Failure to Acknowledge Higher Risk. By the end of reports of concern about the cost and risks of the program were emerging from the Russell Headquarters of Defence. The then incoming Minister, Kim Beazley, ordered an internal review of the project. This eventually reconfirmed the new direction of the program, apparently on the predictable arguments of operational and strategic requirements.

We do not know whether Defence considered, once the strength of Navy's operational and strategic reasoning prevailed, if a concomitant change in procurement strategy was inevitable. Whatever the reasons for failing to change the procurement strategy, 39 the impact on the program was to be profound. Navy now had a program, endorsed by Defence, with high risk factors in almost every facet of its development. In essence, they had opted to develop a Holden amongst submarines, a design uniquely suited to Australian conditions and with much promise, but carrying much more risk than the more limited but proven off-the-shelf designs.

The need to achieve greater performance in certain areas to improve the usefulness of the submarines may have justified this decision. However, the failure to understand or to communicate its implications had the most profound influence on the development of the new submarines and for the Service became the root of both subsequent problems and much public grief. Pointers to Decision Making? Over the years of contentious debate about the Collins class submarines there have been many suggestions as to what has gone wrong with the program.

This section looks at various aspects of the procurement program to judge whether these contributed to the problems subsequently encountered when the boats were introduced into service. Building the Submarines in Australia. One argument about the Collins submarine program is that it was a mistake to build the boats in Australia and that it would have been preferable to build them overseas. This paper has already demonstrated that there was little interest in building the boats other than in Australia.

It has also been suggested that this decision had significant consequences for the outcome of the program. However, building in Australia was not a factor that handicapped the program. Performance of World Standard. Firstly, it must be understood that submarine construction is an extremely complex and difficult business. Even yards which have been building submarines for decades cannot produce perfect product at all times. An example of this is the recent withdrawal from service of all 12 RN Swiftsure and Trafalgar class nuclear attack submarines because of problems in the their nuclear reactor cooling systems.

This Oberon was delayed for several years after the builder fitted cabling incorrectly. Contract liability required its complete removal and recabling. This is a faster rate than was achieved by the Dutch and British yards in delivering their boats that were contenders for the Collins class program. This would tend to suggest that the evaluation of Kockums' production methods made early in the project was correct and that the Swedes proved capable of transplanting them to Australia.

The Collins class program was unique in building all the boats in Australia and almost all from scratch. All other programs to transfer construction of a submarine design to a second country have involved building at least the first and usually more, at the designer's yard. The majority have made heavy use of sub-assemblies of prefabricated components which continue to be produced in the designer's yard.

For the Collins program only the bow section of the first boat was manufactured in Sweden. This in fact, told the tale of the quality of Australian production, since this section was shown to have an unacceptable number of welding defects which appeared nowhere else in the program.

In order to assure HMAS Collins' longer term serviceability, these were repaired by Australian welders at the ASC plant during a subsequent maintenance cycle for the submarine. Fostering Australian Industrial Expertise. The program has also contributed to improving the quality of Australian manufacturing on a national scale.

The ASC's Adelaide facility is an assembly yard, building submarines from components provided from across Australia. When the submarine project began there were only 35 Australian companies certified to the quality levels required for defence work.

Procuring Change: How Kockums was Selected for the Collins Class Submarine

By there were In the process of building the Collins class, ASC has successfully integrated many areas of technology which are equal to, or better than, that existing elsewhere. One of the areas originally thought to be of highest risk, the automated submarine management system has met requirements, leading the RAN to claim the Collins as the 'world's first "fly by wire" submarines'.

The American and British navies refused to share details of the anechoic tiles of rubberised, sound absorbing material, glued the outside of the hull used by their submarines to help reduce the effectiveness of active sonar surveillance systems. Accordingly, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation DSTO then developed tiles for the Collins which exceed the performance of those used by the northern hemisphere navies. Finally, it cannot be thought insignificant to exceed the goals originally set for local content of the new submarine project.

Seventy per cent of the value of physical work and 45 per cent of its electronics was performed in Australia. How the Other Competitors Fared. One of the ironies of the Collins program is that pursuing the original procurement strategy would not have resulted necessarily in more positive assistance for submarine production in Australia. None of the other contenders had trouble-free programs and their subsequent history reinforces the conclusion that Kockums was the right builder to select at the time.

The lead boat of the Dutch submarine design, Walrus, was launched at the end of but caught fire the following year whilst being fitted out by the shipbuilder. All her internal fittings and cabling were destroyed and completion of the Walrus was delayed for three years. The British Type suffered a three year delay, largely due to faulty torpedo tube hatches and safety concerns with the power plant. However, in the British Government scrapped the Type s to save money.

They were eventually purchased by Canada, which has removed the British weapons control system and is retrofitting those from the Canadian Oberons which the Type is replacing. Two of the Thyssen TR class were built for Argentina in the contractor's German yard and kits for four more were shipped to Argentina.

Twelve years after the commissioning of the first submarine, the first Argentinian built boat was only 52 per cent complete. The yard was then sold, work on the submarines abandoned and the parts retained for spares. Not even HDW, with the most extensive record of overseas sales and production programs can guarantee success all the time. Part of HDW's credentials in bidding for the Collins program was that it had signed an order in December to supply four submarines to the Indian navy, two them to be built in India. In the event, these two submarines were delivered five and six years late, cost twice as much as the two built in Germany and were the subject of disputes about the adequacy of technical support from HDW and the costs of spare parts and support packages.

Past Glory; Present Problem? Whilst the building of the submarines in Australia is a demonstrable success, it is yet to be seen if that process will achieve its policy objectives. That is, whether having built the submarines in Australia will prove to be an effective basis for supporting them throughout their service lives. If anything, ASC's productivity has proved painful. With a program of finite length and no major construction work to replace it, continued employment of the highly skilled workforce as relevant to the ongoing support of the submarines as to their construction is difficult.

By May , at the launch of the fifth boat, Sheean , ASC projected that its strong workforce would be cut to by the end of the year. With production drawing to an end, the viability of ASC depended on securing contracts for the first cyclic refit of each submarine. In the meantime, however, the prospect of building two more submarines, which had persisted in the program as a continuously delayed option, was finally scotched. The Government's white paper did not support the development of a new variant of the submarine that had been in the Department's planning cycle.

Since all the RAN's submarines are based in Western Australia, logic suggests Perth should be the site for depot level maintenance. This involves a complete removal and reassembling of the components inside the submarine. As such, it is a difficult and potentially costly exercise for which, in most cases, the yard which built the submarines should be best placed. In letters to the Premiers of South and Western Australia in July , the Prime Minister confirmed that the Government considered ASC best placed to carry out major maintenance of the submarines, including 'full-cycle refits'.

A Future with the US? In the two years between the suggestion that cyclic refits might be performed in Perth and the Government's decision otherwise, the structure of ASC has changed dramatically. By mid, the Government was the sole owner of ASC and was holding it for future sale, preferably as a catalyst in the rationalisation of the Australian defence shipbuilding industry. However, the Government's handling of ASC ownership over the last two years has made access to intellectual capital the central issue concerning the long-term support of the submarines.

For some time, the Government had been considering ways of selling its Throughout the 14 months before the Government purchased ASC, the Minister often asserted that the primary objective of any future arrangements at ASC was to ensure the rectification of the submarines' faults and the best option for their long-term support.

How Kockums was Selected for the Collins Class Submarine – Parliament of Australia

This remains the objective for what is now the intended sale of the company. However two years after Kockums, the design authority, changed hands the future of ASC remains unclear. All that can be said with confidence is that, although the Australian building site remains a part of this structure, the European design authority is not. The task force that in worked on future structure options for ASC was asked to seek ways of involving both European and American companies. However, an increasing range of reports has identified the US company Electric Boat as the likely source of the submarine expertise in a privatised ASC, with some claims that it is expected to buy a share of up to 40 per cent.

Whatever the reasons, there is a significant risk in this approach to the sale of ASC. This is, simply, that Americans do not build conventional submarines. The issue is probably not so much whether an ASC relying on American expertise might find it difficult to manage cyclic refits. More important is that the Americans have no technology base in conventional submarines and no research into leading-edge technologies, such as Air Independent Propulsion.

They will be limited in their approach to upgrading the submarines over the remaining 25 years of their operational lives. The RAN appears to recognise the risk in this situation. Commodore Paul Greenfield, Director General of Submarines, acknowledged that Kockums, as the designer, had a very important role in the future support of the submarines and hoped that the formerly strong relationship between Navy and Kockums could be restored.

Whatever the discussions between the parties, there is an appearance that the Commonwealth does not have access as yet to sufficient intellectual property rights to ensure that ASC can be effective. McIntosh and Prescott argued that the contract for the submarines ought to cover all necessary intellectual property rights to cover ongoing support requirements. Until a resolution can be achieved which provides ASC with the intellectual capital it needs, both to maintain the submarines and to upgrade them as might be required by changing strategic circumstances, the ultimate viability of the strategy to build them in Australia will remain unproven.

Accessing appropriate intellectual property, maintaining the skills base and other aspects of the intellectual capital 70 ASC needs to be efficient, therefore, remains one of the risks to be overcome before the shipbuilding aspects of the program can be called a complete success. The Collins Class are very large submarines by the standards of conventional boats. Displacing tons on the surface, they are the second largest class of conventional submarine built since the Second World War. Only the Japanese-who have been builders of large conventional submarines since the s-come close to the Collins, with the Oashio class displacing tons.

The bulk of the Collins class submarines has been criticised for driving up the cost of the program partly true since hull cost rises with displacement , largely due to the RAN's desire for a boat with considerable range. However, bulk is not necessary to achieve long range in submarine design. Thirty years ago, the Soviets were able to achieve a 20 mile range in their Foxtrot class and the Indian Shishumar, Italian Sauro and Pakistani Agosta B classes have more or less comparable range to the Collins on about half the displacement.

The Performance Advantages of Size. Rather than range, the bulk of the Collins design confers advantages for submarine operations which probably justify the boast that it is among the best performing conventional submarine platforms in the world. The crucial challenge in submarine design is to provide sufficient volume to accommodate equipment, stores and weapons, living space for crew, machinery spaces for propulsion and as much volume for battery storage as possible.

Greater displacement provides the basis for that. At one level adequate hull volume equates to endurance and that for the Collins' is more then adequate. Design endurance is 90 days, though a notional standard patrol is only 70 days, thus allowing a submarine to be deployed on station at nm for seven weeks. The volume can be used for fuel oil storage tanks greater range nm, surfaced for the Collins or improved crew and systems accommodation better performance of duties , but it can also be used for propulsion and batteries.

The Collins class has sufficient installed power to make them, with a reported maximum speed of 24 kts, 72 among the fastest conventional submarines ever built. Maximum speed, however, is not usually a relevant performance measure for conventional submarines, as it quickly exhausts battery capacity.

In Germany perfected high performance conventional submarines by providing greatly increased battery space and adding the snorkel basically, an air tube which extends above the water's surface to allow them to be recharged whilst submerged. Since then, increasing battery storage has been one of the objectives of conventional submarine development. Submerged Endurance and Indiscretion Ratio. Most importantly, sufficient volume for large electrical storage capacity allows a reduction in the submarine's indiscretion rate for which, see 'Experience with the Oberon Submarines'.

The necessary corollary to take full operational advantage of this is the capacity to recharge the batteries in an acceptable time. For this, large hull volume also helps, for it provides the space and ease of layout for large diesel engines and generator sets. Collins uses generators rather than alternators and has a combined generation capacity of 4. This gives it amongst the most impressive platform dynamic performance available, an important area of performance advantage over, for instance, the most commonly used Third World submarine, the Russian-built Kilo. The result of this combination is that the Collins is already close to the type of submerged performance that will only become available to other conventional submarines if radical new Air Independent Propulsion AIP systems prove successful.

On sea trials of HMAS Collins, the combination of large battery storage and high generator capacity was shown to allow the submarine to maintain an energy cycle under patrol conditions which required it to snort running its engines whilst submerged, by use of a snorkel for 'less than a few minutes' in every 24 hours:. Sea trials of the first-of-class have proven that the Collins as it is now can stay submerged for such a long time, and have such a low rate of indiscretion, that a refit of an AIP system is not really needed and would simply not have any cost benefit.

It is unlikely that a submarine mast exposed on the surface for only a few minutes will be detected in time to initiate an attack. Hence, a Collins submarine should be able to remain undetected within its patrol area for extended periods without having to withdraw to safer waters to recharge batteries. This not only enhances submarine operations but can over exert opposing forces by imposing higher rates of Anti-submarine Warfare ASW operations.

The Collins' high submerged endurance can be accessed throughout a deployment. In comparison, AIP systems are limited in practical operations by the comparatively limited volume of oxidant that can be carried. Noise Control and Stealth. The Collins class are intrinsically quiet submarines. Equipment is isolated from the deck with vibration absorbing fittings and the whole deck assembly is similarly isolated from the hull. Consequently, noise caused by vibration radiating into the water is reduced to such low levels that early testing revealed the Collins to be quieter than background ocean noise, 76 a finding confirmed by more recent tests at a highly sensitive acoustic range in the US.

The noise characteristics of a submarine can be further masked by operating at great depth, hopefully hiding beneath a 'thermal' layer, a mass of water with temperature, density or salinity characteristics different to the surrounding ocean is so that they disrupt the normal radiation of sound. With a diving capacity greater than metres the Collins class is well equipped to make use of these tactics. The acoustic performance is further complemented by the use of Australian designed anechoic tiles, fixed to the external surface of a submarine to absorb some of the energy radiated by active sonar systems.

Unlike the tiles used by British and American submarines, these do not often fall off. The level of noise generated by a submarine varies with the mode in which it is operating.

The very low levels of noise noted above are achieved in the 'patrol quiet' mode of operations, where the submarine is 'crawling around' at kts on battery power and the crew are observing strict noise control procedures. In other modes, different sources of noise are introduced. When the submarine is snorting, the vibration of its diesel engines creates considerable noise. When it is travelling at high-speed the flow of water over the hull and cavitation around the propeller creates a different source of noise.

These latter two cases are dealt with below. It is the inherent stealthiness of the Collins class, due to its low noise signature in the patrol quiet mode, which has recently attracted international attention. It repeated the dose during Exercise Tandem Thrust off north Queensland in May , 'sinking' two American amphibious assault ships in waters of between metres depth, barely more than the length of the submarine itself.

That these achievements were recorded by Waller , reinforces the claims for the inherently good stealth characteristics of the design. By exploiting these characteristics, Waller was able to perform well under exercise conditions and 'was able to operate in a way that did not expose her faults. What Waller could not do was demonstrate the unusual degree of mobility her propulsion system allows, because of noise generated by the hull.

Nor could she demonstrate the ability to use long range anti-shipping weapons, because of the failure of the combat system. In May the crew had to call for assistance from a Brisbane suburban IT repair company to fix 'scanners', 84 so that the submarine could continue its deployment to the exercise area. Nor was she herself invulnerable. Waller was detected and 'sunk' during Tandem Thrust, a reminder, at least, that submarines are no more invulnerable than any other weapon of war and that a great number of submariners have died in combat.

Problems, Deficiencies and Failures: Against this, the Collins class suffers from a collection of publicised deficiencies sufficient for the RAN not to commission the boats as normal into full naval service. Although recent figures show a decided improvement in recruitment and the Navy now has 55 per cent of its complement, it will not be until that it will meet its personnel requirement.

In general terms, the failures of the Collins class can be grouped under the heading of components, noise and the CDS. A common thread in these defects is their origin in the unique specifications set for the submarine by the RAN, often in areas where relatively standard and well proven equipment might have been thought adequate or where experience indicated significant risk. To avoid being overly prescriptive, it should be noted that not all problems with the submarine conform to this simplified criteria.

To be fair to the Service, defects appear to have originated with, or been exacerbated by, the attitude of various of the contractors.

How Kockums was Selected for the Collins Class Submarine

On the other hand, the attitude of some component vendors appears to have had a significantly beneficial impact on the outcome of the project. For instance, Schneider, the manufacturer of the electric motor, acknowledged problems with the motor in early trials and fixed these at its own cost. Most of the components used in submarine building are made by specialists who produce a range of equipment to meet the requirements of different designs. Many problems with submarine performance are not issues of design but of poorly performing or incorrectly specified components. Unless a submarine has truly revolutionary performance requiring the development of new components, most of these problems should be rectified by simply switching components or suppliers.

This, in fact, was done to rectify a problem with the original propeller shaft seal which was allowing excessive water into the hull. However many of the problems with the Collins submarines do not appear to have originated with standard components. The boats' propeller produced excessive cavitation, 90 which is a source of unacceptable noise, and was brittle.

Submarine propellers are not exactly 'components', in that they require a level of technology which little more than a decade ago placed them highly amongst the targets of Soviet espionage. The RAN specified that the propellers be made of Sonoston, a material that promised to reduce noise through its low resonance characteristics. However, it proved liable to crack with only small changes in operational profile and difficult to manufacture to the extent that the propellers had to be hand finished.

As multi-axis, computer controlled machine tools are needed to manufacture low noise propellers, it is not surprising that those of the Collins were too noisy and needed replacement too frequently. A component failure that can be linked similarly to the RAN's development of unique specifications is that of the Collins' search and attack periscopes.

The Collins' periscopes suffered from excessive vibration and optical characteristics that were both a hazard to boat safety and an Operational Health and Safety danger for the crew. This is a result of specifications that were not fully evaluated 94 and it is difficult to believe that the RAN could not have selected an existing, proven design which would have performed adequately.

Essentially ,conventional submarines are diesel powered electricity generation systems.

Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement

However, in conventional submarines this process nearly always occurs underwater, which greatly complicates all aspects of the activity. The Collins class suffered problems across the range of diesel engine functions. The diesels produced excessive vibration and attendant equipment failure, ranging up to a damaged crankshaft in one case. The maritime industry bench markers, Lloyds Register, found the performance of the engines to be uniquely bad amongst its class of diesel engine applications.

The Nature of Diesel Engine Problems. Part of the problem was caused by the engines ingesting excessive water submarine operations require seawater to be used as ballast in the fuel tanks as fuel is consumed. Some of it to the recommendation by the engine designer, Hedemora, of an inappropriate engine operating speed. More stemmed from diesel exhaust flow problems, as the exhaust gasses are expelled underwater to mask the boat's presence. Yet other difficulties lay with excess consumption of lubricating oil.

Head gaskets have been blown because of use of a turbo charger exhaust pressure operation in the new submarines rather than the supercharger mechanical operation more traditional for submarine diesels. The gear train appears to have design flaws that adversely affect reliability. Since propulsion is at the heart of a submarine, the problems of the diesel generation system affect performance.

Procedures to circumvent the water contamination problem involve leaving 30 per cent of the fuel oil in the tanks. The extreme vibration produced by the engines would have endangered the submarine whilst it was snorting, passing into the water as noise that would have alerted enemy forces over long distances. Deficiencies a Consequence of Overall Design Objectives. The difficulties with the diesel engines are linked to the Navy's desire for an outstanding submerged performance from its new boats and the consequent large size of the class.

To meet the high power demand entailed, the design originally was to use four diesels. Whilst this arrangement had the elegance of arranging all three abreast, the selected engine subcontractor, Hedemora, had not developed submarine diesels of this size before. This lack of experience led to an inappropriate engine speed being recommended. In these cases, the Navy's pursuit of its ideal, not just of the submarine itself, but of its systems and, in some cases how those systems were produced, compromised what was otherwise a basically adequate package.

Defects were exacerbated where the feasibility of unique components was not tested. This is perhaps the most peculiar of the problems 'suffered' by the submarine. It is also an area of significant dispute. There is an argument that the problem is not 'real' in a contractual sense. ASC has maintained that it is not responsible for hull generated noise above 12 kts because the contract cited no performance requirements in this area and, therefore, the submarines were not designed to meet them.

Why Submarines Usually Proceed Slowly. It is not usual for a conventional submarine's noise signature at high-speed to become such an issue. They generally operate slowly and cautiously when likely to be in the vicinity of enemy aircraft, ships and submarines. No submarine at speed is at its quietest and stealth, the over-riding advantage they possess, must be maintained at least until an attack can be initiated. A snorting submarine generates greater noise levels turbulence from the snorkel mast and reciprocating, explosively driven diesels, compared to the rotating electric motor which are many times more detectable than the submerged boat.

Just as importantly, such noise also reduces the effectiveness of the submarine's sonar systems, thereby degrading its ability to detect hostile shipping. There are parts of a mission profile, such as quickly loosing depth, transiting to or from a patrol area or for escape when brought under attack, where speed could be a useful attribute. With the exception of loosing depth, this potential has been limited by the practicalities of technology.

Submarine operations may require the boat to change depth quickly for a variety of reasons and high-speeds can be reached during such manoeuvres. Not only would noise induced by poor flow characterises increase the risk of detection but it has raised, in the Collins case, the possibility of collision with another vessel if the manoeuvre were performed near the surface.

There seems little reason why the level of concern should be as sharp in other areas. Previous generations of conventional submarines had little power available for recharging batteries if snorting at high-speed. The common transit speed for the Oberon class was around 8 kts. Neither is speed necessarily a good defence. For instance, the Thyssen TR class which at 25 kts lays claim to be the fastest conventional submarine around can sustain this pace for a distance of only 20 miles.

Like all types of military equipment, submarines have to be operated within their technical limitations and navies are differentiated by their skill in extracting optimum performance within these limits. The hull flow noise generated by the Collins at high-speed comes from the nature of its casings and fin, and from the interaction of the turbulence they generate with the propeller. The casing is a fibre class structure built on top of the pressure hull, projecting above the water and mounting the fin often incorrectly referred to as the conning tower.

It covers external equipment and houses some of the sonar arrays. There are indications that the design of the casings gave higher priority to maximum sonar performance rather than hydrodynamic efficiency. The Collins class today is marked by a 'dimple' just behind the bow where the large casing covering the bow sonar is fared into the rest of the structure. This forms an obvious point of disruption to flow and was not a feature of early models of the submarine.

At some stage of the design, a larger sonar array was apparently thought more important than maintaining the smooth flow of water around the bow. Originally, Kockums chose to end the deck casings with an abruptly rounded-off design. This generated vortices at speed which were passed through the propeller, increasing cavitation and, consequently, noise. This problem has been reduced significantly by a more finely tapered ending to the deck casing and modifications to the shape of the fin.

An Outcome Influenced by Other Objectives. This preference in design, allied to the fact that Navy had specified no noise performance for the submarine at speeds in excess of 12 kts, must have indicated to Kockums that high-speed characteristics were not a central element of the design.

Nonetheless, by the time that the first-of-class trials were underway, Navy had changed its mind and considered the issue of noise at speed of sufficient importance not to accept the submarines as designed. As mentioned above, the Collins class is considered extremely quiet when operating in the patrol quiet state, the predominant mode of submarines under combat conditions. In addition, the design of the Collins' power plant has ensured that its mechanical noise increases very little with speed.

It may be that the dynamic capabilities of the Collins design led Navy to re-conceptualise the extent of tactical mobility that was possible with a conventional submarine. This would then have demanded that the noise problem at speed, previously under-emphasised, be solved. Crew numbers were also said to be unusually low at around 30 personnel. There was no existing contract from any other client to build the design, which was 25 per cent larger than the original and the company had no experience of managing the overseas construction of submarines.

United Shipbuilder Bureaux and de Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij RDM were a well established and highly regarded Dutch team which had pioneered the adaptation to conventional submarines of the so-called 'tear-drop' hull shape of SSNs. Of the designs submitted, RDM's was the least changed to meet the RAN specification probably because, at tons, it was the largest. Although the first of class had not yet been completed, it was an iteration of the partnership's earlier Zwaardvis class, a version of which had recently been ordered by Taiwan.

However, at the time, RDM employed traditional shipbuilding techniques in its submarine yard and its man-hour costs were reported to be comparatively high.

The Swedish company, Kockums, was a long established submarine builder for the Royal Swedish Navy, having produced its first submarine in In the twenty years leading up to the selection of the Collins class design, Kockums had designed and produced five generations of submarine, 33 a higher rate of activity than any of its competitors except, perhaps, HDW. It was also established as a company that produced innovative designs and was known to be experimenting with alternative forms of conventional submarine propulsion. Its designs were amongst the first to be extensively automated and use remote control of machinery.

As a result, they required small crews for the time typically around Consequently, the Vastergotland class, then the latest Kockums design, displaced two-thirds as much as the Oberons and its offering for the RFT, the ton 35 Type had to be considered as a new design. The company had exported no boats, partly because of Sweden's policies on its neutrality in international disputes, which had made it appear to be an 'unreliable supplier' in some quarters.

By the early s the Swedish Government was actively seeking to overcome this image, driven by the need to export defence materiel to support the local defence industry, upon the survival of which the Swedish defence policy of neutrality and full independence had been predicated. Kockums had developed designs for export markets and had been a finalist in the Indian navy evaluations eventually won by IKL with a ton design which had a range of 10 nm and required a crew of Kockums was particularly well regarded for its advanced production management practice.

Using the system it was able to reduce production costs by 25 per cent. Vickers was a long established naval engineering company that had built many classes of nuclear powered submarines for the Royal Navy RN before being rationalised into the conglomerate, British Shipbuilders. However, by the early s it had been nearly a quarter of a century since Britain had designed a diesel electric submarine and the Type remained a design, with the RN not having placed a contract at the time of the RFT. This order was placed in November but it eventually became apparent that the RN boat could not meet Australian requirements, and indeed was thought to have endurance insufficient to meet all the mission profiles of the British Service.

This had displacement increased by almost 20 per cent, to nearly tons, in order to accommodate the fuel, batteries and weapons reloads specified by the RAN. This version was reported to interest the RN for the remainder of what was thought likely to be a 10 boat program, but was said to be considerably more expensive than the Type Vickers had no experience of managing construction programs overseas but had established a subsidiary in Australia, which, as the manager of Vickers Cockatoo Island Dockyard, was responsible for the refit of the Oberons.

However, VSEL appeared less interested in Australian production than in preparing an 'assembly' package. It appears that none of the above respondents could meet the Navy's specifications and it was reported that this deficiency was viewed as being sufficiently significant to delay the project for a year or so. Of the specific design shortcomings, it was reported that the original Type was too small by about tons to accommodate the CDS, one of the German designs was too narrow to accommodate it, whilst the other could accommodate only four torpedo tubes instead of the six required.

The French conventional boat was said to be too noisy, the Walrus class to be too expensive and the Kokums design no more than that. The Italians were said to have withdrawn. With the benefit of hindsight, the most ominous of the problems being encountered in the development of the project was with the CDS, for which five would-be producers had expressed interest.

The credence of such claims was supported by further reports on the growing cost of the project and by rumours of increasing bureaucratic turmoil in its decision making processes. The likely cost increase and the growing risk, associated with including no design already proven by overseas naval service, reportedly prompted resistance to the project within the decision making committees of the Department of Defence. Civilian officers of the Department, in particular, argued for the program to refocus on seeking smaller, cheaper designs. The most successful of these, such as the U boat offensives in the Atlantic in both World Wars and the USN submarine offensive against the Japanese, have been strategic campaigns conducted in the enemy's focal areas at long range from home base.

Tactical defensive campaigns, such as those which were operational dogma for the Soviet and Italian submarine forces in World War Two, were not attended by success. The Paper Boats Surface: Selection of the Final Short List. In addition, the Government decided that two groups, rather than the one recommended by Defence, 52 should be selected as the 'finalists' for the CDS.

There was increasing evidence that evaluation of the industrial package offered by the two contenders would play an important part in the final selection of the new submarine. From the beginning, the decision was extremely controversial. The choice annoyed traditionalists, Anglophiles, communist conspiricists and the other competitors. It was the first time that Australia had opted for combat platforms developed other than in Britain, the US or France. These factors provided sufficient hurt to tradition and vested interest to ensure a protracted public campaign against the selection.

Among the distractions promoted were claims that neither the USA or British governments would permit their naval technology to be incorporated in the submarine if the RAN persisted with the German and Swedish companies. Although the Commonwealth Ombudsman subsequently found that information had been leaked from an unknown source , 59 he found no credible evidence of malpractice. In any case, the backbenchers' committee was irrelevant to the submarine selection procedures.

The Minister had given them a brief only to inquire into the Australian industrial aspects of the project and, in any event, the committee meeting occurred after the selection of the two companies. The Importance of Industrial Factors in the Selection. In retrospect, the identity of the two companies selected should have come as no surprise, for both had strong technical recommendations.

What the critics had failed to recognise was the extent of the determination for change in Australian defence procurement practices. The Defence White Paper Australian Defence , of , had developed a theme of increasing self-reliance in defence policy. The Coalition Government of the day had sought to promote relevant Australian industrial capacities as a way of applying the policy. They had built a fleet support tanker of French design, HMAS Success , in the ailing Vickers Cockatoo Dockyard in Sydney, had approved construction of a fleet of mine hunters of uniquely Australian design and had approved in principle the construction of two US designed FFG-7 frigates in the largely under-used naval dockyard at Williamstown.

However, the development of the mine hunter soon became problematic and building of Success had been a disaster. By the time it was commissioned, the vessel was three years late and had cost three times the amount quoted to build in a French yard. By , the Wamira project was in difficulties and was to be cancelled by the mids. Nevertheless, the Labor Government elected in followed its predecessor's lead with increased vigour, because it had been elected during a severe recession.

However, they did so within the constraints of a more rigorous economic policy which carried an increased market orientation. The Government showed that defence construction projects would no longer be used for job creation when it resisted union demands to build a second tanker at Cockatoo Island, ultimately condemning the yard to extinction. Commodore Oscar Hughes, when appointed to lead the new submarine project in , said of the process to select the eventual winner that it would be based on juggling into the best combination three variables of 'capability, industrial involvement and cost'.

The evaluation of the new submarine project was revolutionary in that it required those companies bidding for the RFT to provide detailed information on their plans to involve Australian industry in the production of the boats. Previously, the question of how to build defence equipment in Australia had been decided in the final selection processes, by use of an arbitrary Australian Industry Participation target or by placing the contract with a government-owned facility.

The new submarine project was the first to differ and consider the issue of Australian production from the initial stages of the evaluation process, as Minister Viner's involvement at the beginning of the project testifies. In this environment, the credibility of the contenders' proposals for building the boats in Australia was important. Those bidders who thought that selection would be determined by the traditional measure of equipment performance, perhaps balanced by any significant differences in price, were to be proved wrong.

Labour hours for some of the other designs were up to four times greater which, in the comparatively high labour cost environment of Australian industry at the time, was in itself an insurmountable handicap. An insight into the type of thinking which may have borne on the selection of the contenders can be found in a report to the then Department of Defence Support from the South Australian submarine task force.

The South Australians found reason to be less-than-convinced about the credentials of the other companies, noting that none were, at the time, fully operational in modular construction techniques. Where the future of the project depended on Defence convincing government that the new submarine would not go the way of previous shipbuilding disasters, the traditional submarine yards were at a disadvantage. When the South Australian's commented that transfer of technology to Australia from Germany or Sweden should be successful because of the strong use of English in those countries, they were indicating a weakness of the French bid.

Inadequate documentation, resulting from problems in translation, had been held to be a cause of the difficulties in building Success. RDM and VSEL adhered to traditional building methods, with modular construction capability still on the drawing board. In the media, 'concerns' were expressed that VSEL's production techniques would bedevil the building of its submarine in Australia. With government expressing a strong desire for Australian construction of the boats, risk in the industrial phase also equated to risk to the final cost.

VSEL's price was reported as being high, and its delivery schedules as doubtful, given the problems it was then experiencing with the Type program for the RN. Strengths of the Shortlisted Companies. On the criteria of performance, as well, the traditional yards may not have fared as expected. The Type was subject to an unfortunately timed broadside by a former RN officer who remarked on the slowness and conservatism of British submarine design. He went on to indicate that the Type would have taken more than 18 years to evolve by the time it entered service and had doubled in cost.

He assessed the version offered to Australia as being underpowered. However, against one crucial specification it was deficient. As stated above, its complement was too high and there was no demand from the RNN to promote a change in boat management philosophy leading to a reduction in crew numbers, which have remained at 52 in all the RNN boats. In terms of designing submarines with small crews, the German and Swedish companies were less of a risk.

HDW submarines in the West German navy operated with 22 crew. These were, admittedly, tiny submarines but HDW had built a design for Greece over 2. Kockums designs were even more parsimonious and its Nacken class, then in service since the late s, required only 27 crew. The Vastergotland class, which Kockums was then building, had the automated ship control systems that the RAN had specified as the means of reducing crew numbers.

As far as the technological basis of their designs was concerned, both of the selected companies drew on considerable experience. The Type design incorporated the newly developed 'Permasyn' electric motor, said to deliver the power of a motor twice its size. Kockums' designs reflected the experience of the attempts of the Swedish navy over three decades to counter the incursions of Soviet underwater forces into Swedish waters in the Baltic Sea, acknowledged as a demanding area for underwater operations 73 and reckoned to have the highest density of underwater craft in the world.

Finally, both companies were amongst the leaders in technological innovation. Both companies were developing 'air independent propulsion' systems, which promised to revolutionise the operation of conventional submarines. Although not a criteria in the selection process, such evidence of innovation indicates that the RAN had grounds of possible future technological advances on which to favour these bidders over their more traditional rivals.

The Selection of Kockums. The Kockums Type submarine design, with a combat system from a consortium headed by Rockwell International, was announced on 18 May as the winner of the evaluation for the RAN's new submarine. The contract covered 95 per cent of the project by value on a fixed price basis, with allowance for inflation and valuation effects on the dollar. The selection of the winning submarine design proved to be as controversial as the earlier short listing.

So far had the project come from its beginnings that the program the Minister announced would:. The combat system, which was to be more advanced than any ever installed in a conventional submarine, was calculated to represent about a third of total construction costs. Construction work was to begin in , initially with the building of the assembly plant at Port Adelaide and with:. Unlike the selection of the short-list, there was no mystery about the selection of the Type In another example of the indiscipline which has continued to mark the conduct of some of the personnel involved, 80 details of the selection process were leaked.

Indeed, before the Minister had made his announcement, the media had revealed that the RAN was dissatisfied with the German design. This may be due to the fact that they have not designed a submarine for the FRGN the Federal German Navy since the early s and their experience with less competent submarine forces which do not maintain the same rigorous operational standards as the RAN, but it has resulted in a design which has failed to realise the potential which Navy expected of it.

Hence it is not surprising that the naval memo saw the Type as:. Their experience should flow on to the benefit of the RAN. The Revised Performance Controversy. The leaks underscored not only the determination of Navy to secure their custom designed base line submarine performance specifications but a determination to dictate how a designer should meet them. In evaluating the designs, the staff of the new submarine project team 84 revised the contenders' claims for the predicted performance of their boats.

This is part of the normal tender evaluation process but, in this case, they invariably reduced the claimed performance of the IKL design and increased that of the Type In several cases these revisions were marked. The covert transit range at ten kts was assessed by Kockums as nm and by the RAN at 10 nm. The technical consequences of this situation were that the Type was adjudged either not to meet RAN requirements or to be inferior to the Type when it did. Fuel stowage and battery volume of the Type were said to be inadequate, perhaps related to the RAN's insistence on full-time air conditioning and the German's apparent reluctance to provide it.

The Navy's evaluation team rated the Kockum's design superior on the basis of:. Overlaying Manufactures Claims with Operational Reality. At the time, these revelations served to renew the controversy surrounding the submarine program. However, hypotheses about deliberate corruption or political interference were difficult to substantiate because of the elaborate mechanisms of the Defence selection process. The staff of the evaluation office were divided into five teams which reported separately on specific aspects of the project.

The decision of the project team was then reviewed at different stages by 5 higher level Defence committees. Notwithstanding the attractiveness of conspiracy theories, there is a more likely explanation for the radical downgrading of the performance claimed for the IKL design. As with most military equipment, the theoretical performance of any submarine design is not the performance it will deliver in operations. Indeed, conventionally used figures may be irrelevant to the operational procedures actually used when the boats are deployed.

Thus, while it is convenient to talk of a submarine's range, operational deployments of these craft are seldom planned in such terms. Rather, submarines transit to an area of operations and patrol this at a patrol speed and in a mode of operation which will be markedly different to that of the transit journey. The period on patrol should ideally be longer than the transit time as, usually, the patrol area is where the submarine can be expected to achieve its mission objectives.

Yet the mode of operation in the patrol area generally, creeping around at four or so knots is such that energy consumption may be less than during transit. Further, whilst transit may be considered dead time in terms of mission objectives, it is by no means a period of ease. The submarine may be observed whilst underway particularly when snorting - running its engines whilst submerged, by use of a snorkel and may be shadowed into the patrol area, by anti-submarine forces, possibly another submarine, positioned along the most likely approach to the patrol area.

Since patrolling unannounced or possibly being in any of a number of patrol areas unbeknown to an enemy is one of the greatest assets to the strategic conduct of submarine operations, disguising the transit route is usually important. This can involve not simply the obvious procedure of regularly changing course and speed but transiting along a course chosen after extensive hydrographic survey for properties favourable to submarine operations.

Despite the image of submarines being isolated from the elements, performance of conventional submarines during transit is also effected by the weather. Snorkels may produce a wake during moderate conditions and can be affected by waves in heavy seas.

Because of these factors submarines never achieve the performance for which they were designed whilst on operations. In general terms, operational performance is usually considered to be significantly below the optimum.

Moreover, the extent of such deviations from theoretical performance can be expected to vary with the prevailing characteristics of particular operational scenarios. Thus, it could have been the case that the project team, in evaluating the bits of the two shortlisted companies, found reasons to disagree with the interpretation that both companies had made of the operational scenarios for which they were designing their bids. Were the Swedes Simply Smarter? It is also likely that the Swedish effort was more carefully targeted.

It was supported more obviously throughout by serving naval personnel than was the German proposal. Kockums appeared to be more aware and accommodating of the effects of RAN operational profiles on base line design performance. Keeping to a theme, he generally explained the alteration of the contending design teams' performance figures as due to their reduction to a common base line.

The development of the Collins submarine program marks a significant change in the history of Australian defence procurement. Australia had built its own naval vessels before but usually to foreign, partially modified or less sophisticated, design. With the new submarine program, Navy proposed the building of a unique design that was at the leading edge of technology.

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